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I. INTRODUCTION
The research conducted in completion of this thesis was
accomplished in conjunction with a study commissioned by the
Chief of Naval Operations and assigned to the TRAINING ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION GROUP at the Naval Training Center, Orlando,
Florida.
Both works trace their origins to a similar analysis
completed in 1975 by a study group working under the authority
of the Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
At that time, as currently, all Marine Corps A6-E pilot
and bombardier/navigator training was provided by Marine Fixed
Wing All-Weather Attack Squadron - 202 (VMAT (AW) - 202)
within the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing at the Marine Corps Air
Station, Cherry Point, N.C. Two major alternatives to that
arrangement were considered by the original study group.
They were
:
1. Transferring all Marine Corps A6-E training to a
similar Navy squadron (VA-42) at the Naval Air Station,
Oceana, Virginia.
2. Transferring all East Coast Marine training require-
ments to VA - 42 and all West Coast Marine training
to VA-128 at the Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island,
Washington.
The result of that study was a recommendation that, "Navy




During the interim, additional concern with the realiza-
tion of maximum training efficiency combined with changes in
the force composition of both Marine and Navy aviation units
to generate renewed, high level interest in the question of
possible consolidation.
The assignment of a second operational Marine A6-E
squadron to the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing in El Toro, Cali-
fornia presented increased potential for utilization of the
Navy facilities at Whidbey Island. Marine aviation officials
felt that this situation might well impact on the cost/benefit
relationship presented in the original study. Additionally,
the proven analytical talents of the Training Analysis and
Evaluation Group were determined to be more fully attuned to
the completion of a comprehensive evaluation of the problem.
This thesis was generated from personal interest in the
question of A6-E consolidation stimulated by a tour of duty
with VMAT(AW)-20 2 and several opportunities to work, on-site,
with both VA-42 and VA-128. Research was conducted concur-
rently with the TAEG study team and included field trips with
that group to El Toro, Whidbey Island, and Orlando.
The assignment given to TAEG by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions was to evaluate the possibility of either transferring
60% of the Marine requirement to the Navy training unit at
Oceana, Virginia (VA-42) and 40% to the unit at Whidbey Island,
Washington (VA-128) , or transferring all 100% of the Marine
requirement to one of the two Navy facilities.
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In accomplishing that task, the TAEG study group concerned
itself with matters pertaining to aircrew training, related
enlisted training, and other peripheral issues associated with
the basic proposal. Included in their work was a considera-
tion of three central issues around which this thesis is
centered. They are:
1. What benefits, if any, would accrue to Navy and Marine
A6-E aircrew training by consolidation of training
facilities?
2. What, costs or savings would result from such a con-
solidation?
3. What specific method of consolidating would maximize
any benefits and/or savings to be realized?
The data base for both the TAEG report and this thesis
was collected jointly by the members of the TAEG study group
and the author. As that data was collected, it became appar-
ent to all parties involved that a sound, comprehensive eval-
uation should not be restricted to just the two possibilities
suggested by the CNO. Consequently, the research for both
works was conducted with the intention of establishing the
most efficient mix of Navy and Marine Corps' A6-E training
assets. That process involved a close examination of the
status quo situation, the CNO generated distributions, and
any other feasible mixes discovered during the course of the
research. Only in this way could all relevant material be
fully and objectively analyzed and an accurate answer be





In fact, examination of the collected data revealed that
prevailing logistical limitations restricted the feasible
consolidation at Naval Air Station, Oceana to approximately
25% of the total annual Marine requirement. That would dic-
tate a 75% allocation to the Naval Air Station at Whidbey
Island, Washington. VA-128, at Whidbey, was found to be fully
capable of absorbing up to 100% of the Marines if required.
These facts generated two options, other than maintaining the
status quo, which were then investigated for relative cost
factors. They were:
Option A : VA-128 absorbing 100% of USMC pilot and
bombardier/navigator training at NAS, Whidbey Island.
Option B : VA-42 absorbing 25% of USMC pilot and bom-
bardier/navigator training and VA-128 absorbing 7 5%.
In examining these options, the TAEG study group made use
of the bombardier/navigator comparability study and the cost
estimates contained in this thesis. The author is indebted
to the TAEG group for much of the facilities and personnel
support data utilized herein.
The cost analysis determined potential annual direct
savings of $1,192,199 for Option A and $4,101,224 for Option
B. These figures were in addition to estimates of $17.5
million in investment savings to be gained from Option A and
$32.5 million from Option B. Investment savings represent a
bound in dollars on the uses foregone in operational squadrons
Each of these figures was computed as an increment of current
expenditures. Their real value is as an indication of a
12

trend toward annual savings to be gained from consolidation,
rather than increased expenditures.
The determination that prevailing and projected conditions
did, in fact, support arguments in favor of consolidation was
based on detailed examination of key elements influencing the
quality and completeness of A-6E aircrew training. Those
elements include the overall environment in ivhich training
is conducted; the stipulated requirements of such training;
the aircraft and personnel support necessary to the conduct
of that training; and the cost/benefit trade-offs that would
emerge from the proposals.
Projected costs (savings), discussed above, are more
fully detailed in Section III and Appendix F. Benefits are
listed in Section IV (Findings) . They include quantifiable
elements, such as reductions in the overall aircraft and
personnel needed to support the total training effort, and
more subjective considerations, such as improved training
facilities and enhanced quality of trained aircrews. This
last element is attributed to numerous factors of attitude
and environment.
Finally, an analysis was conducted to examine the critical
aspects of those factors which most strongly influence the
eventual recommendation for consolidation.
NAVAL AIR STATION, OCEANA
Naval Air Station, Oceana provides services to approxi-
mately 9,000 military personnel that include 23 Regular (and
13

one Reserve) squadrons. The facilities support situation
has not changed significantly from that reported to the Chief
of Naval Operations by the Commander Naval Air Force, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet letter Serial 331D/3456 of 21 August 1975.
Bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQ) , aircraft parking and hangar
space are still critical. Military construction projects
that affect BEW and aircraft parking are listed in i\ppendix
A, Table I. Both the BEW and aircraft parking projects could
impact on the feasibility of consolidating USN/USMC Fleet
Readiness Squadrons.
NAS Oceana, with its associated commands as well as
detachments such as the Naval Aviation Maintenance Training
Detachment (NAMTRADET) , is well equipped to provide services
to the A-6 community. The climatic conditions for the 26-
year period were obtained from the Naval Weather Service and
it was found that NAS Oceana averages Instrument Flight Rule
conditions (less than 1000 feet and 5 miles visibility) 13%
of the time, as compared to 11% for Cherry Point and 8 % for
NAS Whidbey Island. Weather is a significant factor in the
timely completion of the familiarization phase of the A-6
flight syllabus.
The small number of additional sorties generated by an
expansion of A-6 training was determined to provide a negli-
gible impact on air traffic control facilities and Air




Squadron spaces, while space was limited, were generally
excellent to support training. Of particular note were the
administrative spaces, ready room, squadron operation space
with its briefing facilities, and the Air Intelligence spaces
The squadron has limited classroom space but one of the two
rooms used, the learning center, was well equipped.
The aircraft maintenance spaces, while adequate for
present needs, were reported deficient for the expanded
maintenance load. The maintenance requirements are stated
in Appendix A, Table I. Any significant increase in the
number of aircraft supported was reported to require addi-
tional shop, hangar, and ramp space. Completion of Military
Construction Project P-227 will provide additional aircraft
parking. This will occur independent of consolidation.
TARGET FACILITIES
Target facilities, while heavily utilized, appear to be
excellent except for the lack of a radar bombing site. Bomb-
ing and mining targets are available. Target facilities
should be adequate to support the small number of additional




Fleet Replacement Aviation Maintenance Personnel training
is presently housed with the squadron's computer system in
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double-wide trailers which are used for a number of FRAMP
facilities. Extensive FRAMP training is presently being
provided to the Marine A- 6 community. Any significant in-
crease in the number of Marine enlisted personnel trained
would require an increase in FRAMP spaces. Marine instructor




Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point is included in the
discussion of the training environment not as an alternative
to consolidating (at that sight) but because the station
presently supports VMAT(AW) - 202 . A description of the sup-
port presently available to VMAT(AW)-202 will facilitate
identifying the advantages and disadvantages of consolidation
more readily.
MCAS Cherry Point, while supporting fewer squadrons than
Oceana, provides support to approximately 9,000 military per-
sonnel including deployed squadrons. The 12 squadrons fly a
variety of aircraft that include the Harrier, C-9, A-6, and
others. The station has approximately the same space prob-
lems as the other two sites considered. Bachelor officer
quarters (BQQJ space is limited; 2nd MAW BEQ , with a capacity
of 3494, had an occupancy rate of 9 7.5% at the time of the
study team's visit and represents a long term average. Ramp
space is expected to improve with completion of a project
adjacent to VMAT (AW)
-
202
' s hangar. Public Works indicated
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that hangar space is at a premium. The present hangar occu-
pied by 202 is adequate for the A-6 but will not accommodate
the TC4C aircraft. Maintenance for the TC4C must be done on
the ramp or in loaned hangar space.
Unlike the Navy training squadrons, 202 furnishes per-
sonnel directly to the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron
in relatively large numbers. Aviation Intermediate Mainten-
ance Detachment (AIMD) personnel at Oceana and Whidbey are
not included in VA-42 and VA-12S allowances.
VMAT(AW)-202 spaces appear to be somewhat austere and
crowded in the administrative and training areas. The lack
of available space for briefing rooms and operations filing
facilities requires that crews proceed to station operations
to file flight plans. The squadron, as will be discussed
under Personnel, does not have the on-board strength enjoyed
by the Navy squadrons but does have a comparable training
load. It was obvious that the squadron has a strong "can do"
attitude. The descriptions of spaces are only to identify
the pertinent differences in training resources for the
training sites considered. For example, MCAS, Cherry Point
does not have an A-6E Weapons System Trainer nor is there
one scheduled for the station. This obviously deprives 202
of a valuable training resource. The absence of an A-6
NAMTRADET means that all A-6 replacement crews must receive
their training at NAS Oceana.
17

VMAT(AW) - 202 does not have responsibility for training
enlisted replacements as do the Navy training squadrons. The
lack of a NAMTRADET at Cherry Point requires that all enlisted
personnel be trained at Oceana or Whidbey Island. Enlisted
replacements must also proceed to Oceana for formal mainten-
ance training in the FRAMP syllabus.
NAS WHIDBEY ISLAND
Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island provides support service
for approximately 7,000 military personnel including those
deployed. There are 16 Regular and 5 Navy and Marine Reserve
squadrons assigned. The Headquarters of Commander, Medium
Attack Tactical Electronics Warfare Wing, Pacific is also
located aboard. The station is ideally located geographically
for access to training airspace requirements of the A- 6 and
enjoys minimum conflict with non-military aircraft. The
weather conditions as reported by the Naval Weather Service,
for a 26-year period, are Visual Flight Rules (VFR) for a
greater percentage of the year than either Oceana or Cherry
Point.
A- 6E and EA- 6B aircraft are the principal aircraft sup-
ported by NAS Whidbey Island. With its associated auxiliary
field and excellent targets, Whidbey provides a unique envi-
ronment for training and support of A- 6 replacement training.
The small number of additional sorties generated by any con-
solidation is not expected to impact on airspace requirements
18

or the general environment. The adequacy of the various
facilities is discussed further in Appendix A, Table I.
VA-128
Squadron spaces are excellent and with minor exceptions
adequate for consolidation requirements. Training spaces
are also excellent and adequate for any degree of consolida-
tion up to 100% of pilot and bombardier/navigator training.
Ready room, flight planning and mission briefing facilities
are, again, excellent. Weather briefing is available on
closed circuit television and flight plans can be filed from
the ready room. Air Intelligence facilities are located
within squadron spaces and are also excellent. The squadron
facilities and supporting facilities are discussed in greater
detail in Appendix A, Table II.
1 . Environmental Factor Rating
Throughout the study a great deal of information was
collected which was considered significant but difficult to
quantify. Much of this data was comparative in nature and
related to the training environments encountered at each of
the training squadrons. The enclosed matrix provides a sub-
jective evaluation of those factors in an organized format.
The assignment of numerical values is based on the depicted
scale .
The ratings were provided by the members of the TAEG
study team because of their unaffiliated, and therefore more




Judgements were based on the expressed requirements
of squadrons and stations where applicable. They are not
intended to reflect in any way on the organizations but to
assist decision makers in their evaluation of consolidation
recommendations in terms of available quality of training.
In the case of NAS Oceana, several of the ratings for factors
would be increased if pending MILCON projects are completed.
It should be noted, however, that in every category, and
without exception, the ratings for NAS Whidbey Island were




Each facility, capability or factor concerned with the
training environment has been rated on those factors that
impact on consolidation decisions. Inasmuch as MCAS Cherry
Point was not considered as a possible consolidation site,
only those factors possibly affecting the quality of training
or the training environment are rated. The scale is as follows
= No facility or capability
1 = Insufficient or inadequate for present requirements
2 = Meets present requirements, requires expansion to
meet consolidation requirements
3 = Meets consolidation requirements
4 = Exceeds consolidation requirements/notable/unique.
NAS NAS MCAS
FACILITY/ CAPABILITY OCEANA WHIDBEY ISLAND CHERRY POINT
Hangar space 2 3 NA
Aircraft Parking 13 3
Maintenance Spaces 2 3 NA
Squadron Operations
facilities, capabilities
for weather briefing, 4 4 1
filing of flight plans,
and briefing/debriefing
Air Intelligence
facility and capability 4 3
Ready Room 3 3 NA
Training Classrooms
for (pilots, BNs) 2 3 2
Administration 4 4 NA
Air Traffic Control/
Saturation/Environment 3 4 3
Mission Routes 3 4 3
Target Facilities/
Capability 3 4 3
Availability to Weapons
Training Sites (Fallon, 2 3 2
El Centro or Yuma)
Weather Factor
(percent IFR) 13 2
A-6E NAMTRADET 5 3
Nuclear Weapons Training _ _
n




FACILITY/CAPABILITY OCEANA WHIDBEY ISLAND CHERRY POINT
*A- 6E Weapons System
Trai ner 3 3
Capability of parent
station to meet support 3 4 3
requirements peculiar
to A- 6 and its mission
FRAMP 2 2
BOQ 1 3 NA
BEQ 1 3 NA
Messing 3 5 NA
Married Officers Quarters 2 3 NA
Married Enlisted Quarters 1 3 NA
22

II. EVALUATION OF RELEVANT FACTORS
A. TRAINING ENVIRONMENT
The overall environment in which training is conducted
contributes significantly to the eventual quality of the
people trained. In the case of aircrew training, the mission
of the particular aircraft is a critical, but all too often
undervalued consideration. Financial and political factors
are frequently the driving forces behind the geographical
placement of training facilities.
The following paragraphs offer an evaluation of the
logistical situations and environmental characteristics
affecting each of the Navy and Marine A- 6 training sites.
Appendix A, Tables I - VI
,
provides an in depth analysis of
facilities, training resources, and personnel requirements
in matrix form. In addition, an unweighted environmental
factors rating is provided beginning on page
Prior to consideration of those elements, however, it
would be useful to expand on the importance of mission
orientation in the location and management of a training
facility and to examine the relative strengths and weaknesses
of each of the present organizations in that regard.
To grasp the important differences between one facility
and another, it is first of all necessary to understand the
mission of the aircraft and aircrew involved.
23

The A-6 is a two seat, medium attack, all-weather, jet
aircraft. It carries up to 18,000 pounds of ordnance, has a
relatively long on-station capability, and provides accurate
weapons delivery on targets the crew may never visually
acquire, in all weather conditions.
Its primary mission in the Marine Corps is all weather,
close air support of troops in the field. The Navy concen-
tration is more in the area of low level interdiction and
all weather strikes against built up targets. It is signif-
icant that the two missions overlap to a great extent and
both use the same equipment and similar, if not. identical,
techniques
.
The plane's main assets are its sophisticated electronic
navigation and weapons delivery systems. Because of these,
it can function essentially "blind." That is, it was designed
for maximum efficiency in night or diminished meteorological
conditions
Because of the continuing development of anti-aircraft
technologies, planes such as the A-6, which can operate at
extreme low levels and in masked terrain, are increasingly
valuable tactical systems throughout military aviation.
The ideal training environment for a multi-role aircraft
like the A-6 is one which possesses three essential elements:
first, logistical support adequate to a smooth running, con-
tinuous, and flexible training program; second, proximity to
geographical, meteorological, and tactical conditions
24

approximating those in the projected mission environment; and
third, a psychological attitude on the part of the parent and
tenant commands which acknowledges the training environment
to be of primary importance in the development of all future
tactical options.
Any argument for or against consolidation must involve
these three elements and weigh them equally against political
and economic considerations. An examination of these trade-
offs is provided in Section V.
Whidbey Island is essentially an A-6 base (contrasted
with the multi-aircraft concerns at both Oceana and Cherry
Point), and is located adjacent to the Olympic Mountains.
This provides an easily accessible opportunity for low-level,
all-weather, terrain-avoidance navigation in uncluttered
airspace. Cherry Point, in North Carolina, and Oceana, in
Virginia, are both located on the Atlantic Coast about 150
miles apart. The closest available mountains are in the
Appalachian range, about one to two hours flying time dis-
tant. This presents a distinct limitation to the efficient
scheduling of training flights for squadrons at these two
facilities
.
In addition, the more gentle, rolling Appalachians are
barely comparable to the Olympics in terms of diverse navi-
gation challenges. Both east coast bases are further
restricted by relatively heavy commercial and private
25

aviation congestion due to their positions at the southern
end of the northeast corridor.
Overall target availability is another area in which
Whidbey appears to have superior assets. This is due to the
availability of a surveyed Radar Bombing Site in Spokane,
Washington and to VA-128's practice of scheduling dedicated
weapons deployments.
While VA-42, at Oceana, also schedules deployments solely
dedicated to weapons training, there is not a radar bombing
site anywhere on the east coast. This lack of facilities
was considered significant by instructors interviewed at all
three squadrons.
VMAT(AW)-202 suffers from the same lack of a radar bomb-
ing site and is further constrained from dedicated weapons
deployments by personnel shortages and budgetary limitations.
The impact of these restrictions is considered below.
Of similar importance is a particular squadron's ability
to concentrate its efforts on the training function. Re-
stricted by the many logistical and personnel limitations
outlined in the pages that follow, neither 202 nor 42 exper-
iences the same freedom of dedication to training available
to VA-128. There is an unquant if iable
,
yet nonetheless
apparent, attitude at Whidbey Island that training receives




The reasons behind this vary and none are necessarily
derogatory to either the service or the command involved.
Oceana is a crowded, multi-mission, multi-aircraft facility.
Many of VA-42's limitations are attributable to that fact.
Cherry Point in many ways typifies the Marine tradition of
functioning at maximum capacity under very austere conditions,
The problem is determining how much maximum is reduced by the
enforced austerity.
Discussions with various Marine aviation officials indi-
cated that the restrictions which apply to 202 are, in their
minds, typical of the austerity which characterizes Marine
training and operations in general. There appeared to be
a genuine sense of pride on the part of many of those inter-
viewed in the squadron's (202' s) ability to produce qualified
aircrews under such restrictive conditions.
The difficulty encountered with this viewpoint is that
if a reasonable way exists to produce aircrews with equal
or greater qualification levels at reduced cost, then what
has been referred to as austerity is, in reality, an over-
expenditure of resources.
As will be demonstrated in some detail in the following
pages, this is exactly the situation in this instance.
However, the issue at this point is not one of criticis-
ing any particular organization. The point is to recognize
and take advantage of an available opportunity to make the
27

best use of the best possible facilities. A great deal of
the information examined in the pages that follow indicates
the site which most closely approximates the "ideal" location
for either Navy or Marine A-6E training is the Naval Air
Station at Whidbey Island.
B. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
The syllabi for VMAT(AW) -202, VA-42, and VA-128 have
been examined in detail. The assistance of experienced pilot
and bombardier/navigator instructors was used to analyze the
individual flights to determine commonality among them. It
was found that while various training tasks are carried out
under different descriptions and are located at different
points in the syllabi, the pilot syllabus for the Navy and
Marine Corps is at least 80% compatible. The bombardier/
navigator syllabus compatibility is over 90%. An examina-
tion of the respective levels of combat compatibility/
readiness attained in the various training units was con-
ducted in accordance with the assignment of percentage levels
dictated by the Training and Readiness Manual . It was found
that Marines presently achieve about 60 % combat capability
at 202 while both of the Navy squadrons produce a 70-75%
combat readiness. It should be noted that the Navy syllabus
includes training in several areas of readiness not now in-
cluded in the VMAT (AW) - 2 2 syllabi but which are accomplished
28

after arrival at the operational squadrons. These include
such things as nuclear weapons, defensive tactics, and
advanced visual weapons.
The Navy requirement for mining was discussed with
VMAT(AW)-202 and found to be a desirable additional quali-
fication, particularly as there is a precedent for Marine
A-6's conducting mining operations in Hanoi Harbor operations
during the Vietnam War. Conversely, the Marine requirement
for radar beacon bombing was discussed with the Navy squad-
rons. It was the general agreement that this qualification
could be included in their existing syllabi and would be of
value to Navy as well as Marine students.
The need for carrier qualification and the landing
practice which precedes it was determined to be of marginal
value to the Marine Corps and not cost effective to include
in their syllabus. With these two exceptions, the rest of
the Navy syllabus was determined to be satisfactory and even
desirable for Marine aircrews.
Adoption of the Navy syllabus would increase Marine
A6-E first tour syllabus hours from an average of 59.5 to
about 80 and decrease the refresher pilot syllabus from 59.5
to 40.5 hours. The increased advantage of using such facil-
ities as the air intelligence center, radar bombing site,
and weapons system trainer, coupled with nuclear weapons
qualification for increased readiness, would be worth an
29

undetermined amount of additional expenditure to obtain.
The fact that they are available through consolidation at
annual savings makes the proposal even more attractive.
These savings, which are detailed in the Cost section, are
increased further if one considers the elimination of addi-
tional training presently required for students after com-
pletion of 202, which is made possible by adoption of the
proposal
.
1 . Adjunct/Supportive Training
Adjunct or supportive training was also examined.
This includes fire fighting training, aviation physiological
training, deep water environmental training (DWEST) , sur-
vival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training,
Nuclear Weapons Delivery School, VF-43 Instrument School,
and Naval Aviation Maintenance Training Detachment courses.
First tour A6-E replacement pilots are scheduled to receive
this training in the Navy. An analysis of training require-
ments with VMAT(AW)-2 02 and various Marine personnel know-
ledgeable in Marine requirements at Headquarters, Marine
Corps concurred in the following:
a. Fire Fighting School is not an essential
requirement for Marines as it is shipboard oriented.
b. All SERE training for Marines is conducted at
Cherry Point regardless of aircraft or assignment location.
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c. Aviation Physiological Training and Deep Water
Environmental Survival Training are obtained in undergraduate
pilot courses and are not essential for Marine A6-E aircrews.
Requalification can be accomplished in the operational com-
mands .
d. Nuclear Weapons Delivery Training is desirable
and could be conducted at Oceana.
e. Naval Aviation Maintenance Training is essential
and is presently being given to all Marine A6-E crews at
Oceana.
f. Instrument refresher training was considered
desirable by both the Navy and Marine Corps. It is not in-
cluded in the VA-42 syllabus. It is included in the VMAT(AW)-
202 syllabus in the A6.. Instrument refresher training for
Navy students is provided by VF-43 at Oceana in aircraft
other than the A-6. It is preferably given prior to start
of the A6 training but is sometimes delayed due to a shortage
of quotas. Because of the requirement for Marines to receive
instrument training as part of their syllabus, certain adjust-
ments would have to be made to the current scheme of training.
Possible solutions to the problem include: (1) omit refresher
instrument training since all recent graduates of undergrad-
uate pilot training possess up-to-date instrument cards, (2)
train all first tour Marines at VF-43, or (3) obtain instru-
ment refresher and currency for the A-6E in the new Weapons




Since the first choice is inconsistent with a compre-
hensive training program, and the second possibility would,
according to VF-43, involve additional and costly support
augmentation, the use of the Weapons System Trainer appears
to be the most cost effective. The acceptance of simulators
as a valid substitute for in-flight instrument training has
been demonstrated by the Navy P-3 community and is an increas
ingly accepted practice in both the Navy and the Air Force.
In this case, it would offer training in an A-6E (simulator)
as opposed to a TA-4, which is used by VF-43.
Adjunct training for VA-128 A-6E students is accom-
plished in a somewhat different manner. Deep water environ-
mental survival training; survival, evasion, resistance and
escape training; and instrument refresher training are all
accomplished in San Diego prior to reporting to VA-128. The
discussion on adjunct training at VA-42 applies with the
exception of instrument refresher training. For Marines
being trained on the West Coast (VA-128) selection from the
following alternatives would apply:
1. Accept the instrument qualification received in under-
graduate training. VA-128 has indicated that Marines
would be accepted without refresher training.
2. Provide instrument training at VF-126 which would
involve additional expenditures for aircraft, instruc-
tors and maintenance.
3. Provide instrument refresher training in the Weapons
System Trainer.
4. Utilize VMAT-102 to provide the training needed.
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VMAT-102 at MCAS , Yuma has indicated that providing
instrument training for various Marine commands is included
in their mission. The squadron, which operates some TA-4
aircraft, has also indicated a capability in the event that
no alternative was available, but stated that additional
support would be required.
The alternative of providing the instrument training
in the Weapons System Trainer, augmented by a two-day instru-
ment ground school, provided monthly to Whidbey Island by
VF-126 and VA-127, appears to be feasible. This would permit
Marine students to proceed to Whidbey without delaying at
either San Diego or Yuma.
Comparability analysis of the bombardier/navigator train-
ing syllabi at the three squadrons (two Navy and one Marine)
required unique structuring to render meaningful data. This
is attributable to the subjective aspects of the individual
syllabus presentations. Close examination of the academic
and flight programs reveals content to be essentially iden-
tical. Notable exceptions are mining and beacon bombing.
It is the order of content presentation that varies signifi-
cantly, and that variation is usually in direct proportion
to the particular squadron's philosophy of weapons delivery
and system utilization. More often than not, that philosophy
was driven by environmental considerations and asset avail-
ability. For example, the Marine Corps emphasis on close air
support influences a large part of the program at VMAT(AW)-202
33

Similarly, VA-128's access to the Olympic Mountains and the
Spokane Radar Bombing Site permits, and to a large extent
dictates, a program stressing all-weather terrain navigation
and complex bombing. VA-42, on the other hand, is somewhat
restricted regarding search radar terrain clearance work due
to its distance from and space restrictions in the Appalachian
Mountains. VMAT(AW)-202 suffers from similar geographic
limitations
.
As a result of these differences, each squadron has evolved
a training program which attempts to optimize, given the avail-
able assets, while pursuing almost identical objectives. The
degree to which those assets exist and their quality signif-
icantly impacts on the quality of the overall training pro-
gram. In addition to providing a 10 to 15 percent higher
readiness capability per student, the Navy squadrons and
VA-128 in particular appear to have a distinct advantage in
terms of total assets. The possibility that these facts are
related is difficult to ignore.
A flight- by-flight comparison was not feasible due to
variations in syllabi structure and nomenclature. Instead,
an analysis by Phase of Training and Aircraft Utilized pro-
vided a pertinent measure of comparability.
Within the categories, Phase of Training and Aircraft




1. Number of Flights (sorties)
2. Time per Flight
3. Students per Flight
4. Total Flight Time per Student
5. Time on the Equipment (Hands On) per Student
6. Instructor Hours
7. Instructor Hours per Student
The seven categories were weighted evenly. The analysis
indicates a commonality in excess of 90 percent. The method-
ology and statistical data used in computation of bombardier/
navigator compatibility are contained in Appendix B. It is
structured to permit a close comparison of the two Navy
squadrons (one to the other) as well as the Marine unit in
terms of each of the Navy organizations. Within any given
category, the Navy unit with the highest hour total (or
greatest number of sorties) is assigned a value of 1.0000.
The other Navy unit is then described as a percentage of that
figure. Finally, the Marine Corps squadron is listed, within
the category, as a percentage of the first and then the second
Navy squadron. This facilities an examination of all the
critical relationships and helps verify that even within the
same service (Navy) two squadrons doing exactly the same job
find substantially different ways to accomplish it. An example
has been reproduced and is provided on the following page
as an illustration of these points and as an introduction to
the kind of information contained in Appendix B.
The estimate of 80 percent compatibility between the Navy
and Marine pilot syllabi was developed through discussions
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and VA-128. This was deemed appropriate because the skills
required to fly the aircraft are quite similar regardless of
differences in the primary mission of the particular service
branch. The 80 percent estimate is believed to be conserva-
tive.
C. AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS
The number of flight hours required to support Marine
Corps pilot and bombardier/navigator training utilizing the
existing Marine syllabus or modified Navy syllabi is compared
in Tables I and II of Appendix C. Overall, there is a 6%
decrease in A6-E flight hours using the modified Navy syllabi
in lieu of the Marine program, and there is no change in TC4C
flight hours. The rationale for using the modified syllabi
was discussed in Section B, Analysis of Training Requirements.
Table III of Appendix C lists the annual A-6E flight hours
required to support the various levels of consolidation sug-
gested by the Chief of Naval Operations, and the number of
aircraft needed to meet those obligations. The case requir-
ing the most aircraft is the 60/40 split which would involve
a total of 12 additional A-6's. Since this does not exceed
the number available from VMAT(AW) - 20 2 , no additional expense
would be incurred in acquisition.
Based on the analysis of training requirements, the total
annual flight hours in the TC4C aircraft for Marine support
is 755. Assuming that VA-42 and VA-128 are provided three

TC4C's with complete A- 6E systems from existing inventory,
there would be no further need for additional TC4C's to
support consolidation.
In addition to this determination of aircraft needs, the
Navy Fleet Replacement Squadrons independently determined
their supplemental aircraft requirements to support the pro-
posals. Table IV of Appendix C presents a comparison of
their findings with the thesis estimates. The additional
planes determined by both methods are identical. This fact
strengthens the argument that consolidation can be accom-
plished with existing aircraft assets.
Table V of Appendix C is a compilation of A-6E and TC4C
flight hours for a 1001 Marine requirement added to that of
either VA-42 or VA-128. The addition of 100% to either
squadron would increase the A-6E aircraft hours by 84% and
the TC4C aircraft hours by 86%. Table VI of Appendix C shows
the actual number of A-6E's needed for the various consolida-
tions based on an average of 35 flight hours per month per
aircraft. While hours increase significantly, the number of
planes needed to accomplish the training remains consistant
with those required by a modified syllabus. The significant
point is, again, that consolidation accomplished under either
of these guidelines can be achieved with already existing
aircraft assets. More important is the fact that a 100%
consolidation requires less total additional aircraft (11 vs.
12) and consequently results in actual savings.

It is realized that there are other considerations used
in establishing aircraft allowances which are beyond the
scope of this study. Consequently, the author would hesitate
to suggest that the total consolidated aircraft allowance
should be based on this approach.
1. Substitution of a Synthetic Trainer
for In-Flight Trainers
A review of several documents, including the 197 5
NAVAIRLANT study, suggested that receipt of the state-of-the-
art simulators expected would permit the substitution of
simulator time for flight time in the order of 12.5% or more.
During the course of research no commitment could be obtained
nor were there any syllabi found that provided for substitu-
tion of simulator time for in-flight training time. Appendix
D contains an analysis of theoretical implementation alterna-
tives which illustrate possible substitution schemes. It is
based on personal experience with the subject flights and
does not constitute a recommendation.
It is reasonable to expect that a certain percentage
of the present A-6E and TC4C syllabus flights can be accom-
plished in the new simulator. The exact amounts will require
assessment after acceptance of the devices. Table VI of
Appendix C, however, shows the effect of various degrees of
simulator substitution on the number of A-6E aircraft required
Reductions in aircraft hours can be translated into reduced
aircraft, reduced personnel support, and facilities support.
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The possible substitution of trainer time for aircraft time
using the modified Navy syllabi is of importance. Given
that in the foreseeable future no state-of-the-art simulators
are going to be available to the Marine Corps, there is little
possibility that the Marine syllabi could be reduced if Marine
replacement training remains at Cherry Point.
D. PERSONNEL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
Determination of the personnel support requirements for
consolidation of Navy and Marine Fleet Readiness Training was
a most difficult undertaking. The Navy A-6E FRS has a squad-
ron allowance and a manning level. Neither include personnel
furnished to the parent station for intermediate level main-
tenance or housekeeping tasks. The Marine Table of Organiza-
tion includes an allowance for personnel to be provided to
the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron, but personnel must
also be furnished for housekeeping duties from on-board
strength.
Appendix A, Table III presents the squadron allowances
and on-board count for both officer and enlisted of the Navy
and Marine Corps units. It should be noted that there are
considerable differences in the manning levels of the Navy
and Marine squadrons. VMAT(AW)-202 does, however, receive
support from other commands, particularly in the area of
TC4C pilots and some A-6E instructors.
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This indicates one of two possibilities; either the
Marine squadron is undermanned or the Navy squadrons have
more people than they really need. Since both are accomplish-
ing essentially the same training and are producing very s
similar numbers of crews on an annual basis, it may be argued
that the Marine manning levels are more realistic. The Navy
could respond that the higher readiness levels they achieve
and the fact that they do not require outside help proves
that their figures are more pragmatic. The critical issue
skirts both of these points. It is that consolidation would
permit overall reductions in the total number of support per-
sonnel needed to provide the same quantity of aircrews and
is, therefore, a far more efficient alternative.
Early in the research it became apparent that the Marine
personnel support for consolidation requested by the Navy
squadrons and parent activities exceeded the total on-board
strength of the Marine Replacement Squadron in aviation
maintenance Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) codes. It
was determined that the most appropriate way to determine the
support requirements for various consolidation levels was to
request that the Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center
conduct a study to determine the implications of consolida-
tion on manpower levels. NAVMACLANT provided the requested
service and the results are contained in Appendix E. A sum-
mation of the data contained therein indicates that consoli-
dation would require an additional 24 officers and
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approximately 173 extra enlisted personnel regardless of
whether it was done on a 100% or a 60/40 basis.
Tables IV and V of Appendix A list the number of per-
sonnel requested by the stations/squadrons to support the
various proposal levels. NAVMACLANT- furnished data is
provided in a parallel column for comparative purposes. It
should be noted that in some cases the squadrons have requested
fewer officers than determined necessary by the NAVMACLANT
analysis. The reverse is never the case, however.
A member of the TAEG study team visited NAVMACLANT to
discuss the implications of consolidation. It was informally
determined at that time that variations in monthly aircraft





III. COST ESTIMATES ASSOCIATED
WITH CONSOLIDATION
As discussed in the Introduction, cost estimates have
been compiled for those options deemed feasible and real-
istic. They are:
Option A, VA-128 - absorbing 100% of USMC pilot and
bombardier/navigator training at NAS Whidbey Island.
Option B, VA-42 - absorbing 25°s of USMC pilot and
bombardier/navigator training, and VA-128 - absorbing 75%.
A. COST CATEGORIES
Several categories of relevant costs were determined and
data was assembled for each in terms of either their invest-
ment value or the annual direct cost involved. The value of
the information listed in the Investment column requires
further explanation. These figures are presented to indicate
an opportunity value foregone by use of the particular asset
to accomplish training.
In the case of Facilities, the $515,000 savings was
arrived at by multiplying 202 's hangar space by a factor of
value per- square-foot obtained from authorities at Cherry
Point. It does not equal either the original acquisition
cost of the building or the current replacement cost.
The figure is intended to represent a savings which could
be realized by the Marine Corps if consolidation were
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implemented and 202' s hangar was then utilized for purposes
other than training A-6E aircrews. The assumption made is
that the substitute use would have required additional ex-
penditures had the building not become available due to
consolidation. Consequently, a savings is realized. Were
the building allowed to sit dormant as the result of consol-
idation, then the Investment cost would be zero.
Similarly, Investment savings in A6-E and TC4C aircraft
represents an opportunity foregone to utilize those assets
in operational flying as opposed to training (it having been
indicated that training can be accomplished with fewer planes
through consolidation)
.
The other categories considered are Personnel, Travel,
and Ordnance. Appendix D contains definitions for the various
categories and derivation of costs (savings) for each category
Tables II to IV (Appendix D) contains summary cost data for
all cost categories for Options A and B. The incremental
changes in costs for Options A and B follow. (Note: paren-
theses denote savings.)
OPTION A




A-6E Aircraft (14,975,538) 304,000










A-6E Aircraft (29,951,076) (1,680,000)
TC4C Aircraft (2,000,000) (1,110,000)
Ordnance NA 426,500
TOTAL (4,101,224)
The formulas used to determine Annual Direct Costs were
obtained from the current Navy Program Factors Manual , or,
as in the case of Facilities, from the authorities at the
specific base in question. Facilities costs are from the
station comptroller's office, Aircraft costs are from the
manufacturer, and Travel costs are from the particular service
headquarters. The total direct savings indicated refer to
the first year of implementation only and should not be inter-
preted to mean that identical or even similar savings would
be realized every year thereafter. Further analysis of
available data would be required before that conclusion could
be validly drawn.
There are certain restrictions to the viable utilization
of these figures. They were developed in an attempt to deter-
mine cost trends which would eventually emerge from those
levels of consolidation deemed logistically feasible by the
study. The importance of the figures is that they indicate
a trend of reduced expenditures to produce the same number of
crews, and that training would occur in a higher
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quality environment. The assumption here is that a higher
quality environment will influence a higher quality product.
However, the exact figures are not offered as absolutely
accurate nor are they in any way guaranteed.
They do indicate that the Department of the Navy can
train their required number of A-6E aircrews (both Navy and
Marine) in a consolidated fashion which will probably result
in overall savings through reductions in aircraft, personnel,
and facilities support requirements.
Travel costs and Ordnance costs, on the other hand, would
probably increase. Like the other figures presented in this
summary, these are averages based on the assumptions listed
in Appendix D. It is recognized that in the case of aviation
training, variations from these two averages would be the
norm rather than the exception. However, even a doubling of
the costs in these two categories, which is considered unlikely
to occur, would not eliminate overall savings for either of
the options
.
The key element of the Cost estimates remains a strong-
indication that not only could higher quality A6-E aircrews
be produced by consolidation, but it may well cost less to
obtain them. Clearly, a higher quality, more fully trained
product even at equal cost would be beneficial to the service.
If savings can be realized in the bargain, so much the




1. Analysis of aircrew syllabi for both the Navy and
Marine Corps indicates comparability in excess of 80 percent
exclusive of FCLP and carrier qualification. Present Marine
replacement training produces pilots and bombardier/navigators
with a combat capability of 60 percent. Completion of Navy
FRS training less FCLP and CQ is expected to produce Marine
graduates with combat capability of approximately 70-75 per-
cent. The additional combat capability is acquired through
qualification in nuclear weapons, defensive tactics and ad-
vanced visual weapons, qualifications normally received by
Marine replacement pilots after assignment to an operational
squadron.
2. Consolidation should result in a reduction of aircraft
requirements by two A-6E and two TC4Cs. [Appendix C]
3. Personnel support could be reduced by 15 officers and
140 enlisted based on present allowances, or increased by one
officer and decreased by 57 enlisted, based on on-board
strength. [Table VI, Appendix A]
4. Training of Marine replacements at either VA-42 or
VA-128 offers benefits to Marine training of:
a. Use of a modern A-6E Weapons System Trainer
b. Training site availability of a NAMTD
c. Nuclear weapons training
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d. Air Intelligence support
e. Increased readiness
f. Improved training facilities.
5. Provisions could be made to provide an instrument
refresher for Marine replacements now received in type either
through the use of a Navy squadron such as VF-43 or VF-126,
through Marine squadron VMAT-102, or use of the ground training
presently provided at either Oceana or Whidbey in conjunction
with the new A-6E WST
.
6. The facilities at NAS Oceana and VA-42 are presently
inadequate for either 60 percent or 100 percent consolidation.
Completion of pending MCON projects should resolve the exist-
ing BEQ and aircraft parking deficiencies, but not those of
hangar space, maintenance spaces, and training spaces. VA-42
pilot and bombardier/navigator production requirements for
the period FY 80-84 have been reduced by 17 per year. An
equivalent number of Marine replacements could be trained
without addition of training assets or personnel unless the
responsibility of support must be shared.
7. With the exception of FRAMP spaces and a requirement
for additional portable line facilities, the present facilities
of VA-128 are adequate to support a 40 percent to 100 percent
consolidation. Station facilities are adequate to support a
40 percent or 100 percent consolidation of replacement pilot
and bombardier/navigator training. Completion of in-progress





8. The precedent for the concept of the Navy assuming
responsibility for the training of Marine officers and en-
listed personnel as replacements for operational squadrons
has been established in the EA-6B program and has been demon-
strated to be feasible and appears to be functioning effec-
tively at NAS Whidbey Island.
9. VMAT(AW) - 202 , the present Marine replacement training
squadron, is not responsible for providing aviation mainten-
ance training to Marine enlisted personnel. Decisions con-
cerning consolidation of Marine replacement pilot and
bombardier/navigator training should be made exclusive of
FRAMP training requirements.
10. FRAMP training for Marine personnel is currently
being conducted for a large number of Marine enlisted at both
VA-42 and VA-128. Until the assignment of a Marine squadron
previously stationed in Iwakuni, Japan to the Marine Corps
Air Station at El Toro, California, VA-128 was providing all
requested FRAMP training including NAMTD needed to meet the
El Toro requirements. Marine enlisted from MCAS Cherry Point
are being trained in substantial numbers but in a less formal
program. Not all personnel are receiving the complete program
nor are there sufficient quotas to meet replacement require-
ments available.
11. As stated in Section III, analysis of all relevant
data indicates consolidation could be efficiently implemented
according to one of two options:
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A. By VA-128 absorbing 100% of the Marine pilot and
bombardier/navigator training at NAS Whidbey Island.
B. By VA-128 absorbing 75% (a-1 first tour pilots and
B/N's and two transition pilots) and VA-42 absorb-
ing 25% (all refresher pilots and B/N's.
Option B is driven by stated physical limitations at
VA-42. VA-128 is capable of handling any requirement up to
100% of the Marine contingent. VA-42, however, is restricted
and option B is therefore based on the expected reduction in
the overall Navy A6-E training load during the period of
fiscal years 1980-1984. This reduction would correspond to
approximately 25% of the Marine Corps' stated needs during
the same period and would permit direct substitution without
foreseeable additional expense to the Department of the Navy.
It is these circumstances which determine the corresponding
75% figure allocated to VA-128 in option B.
12. Another consideration in the process of evaluating
options is the historical frequency of Marine refresher
trainees generating from the Washington, D.C. and Norfolk,
Virginia areas. It is officers completing staff tours in one
of these two locals that generally make up the bulk of the
refresher training load. This factor favors option B with
regard to geographical considerations. Option B also allows
all first tour Marine aircrews to enjoy the stated advantages
of the facilities at VA-128 (which are listed in the Environ-
mental Factor rating of Section I-A) while maintaining
geographical flexibility through the availability of an east
coast training site for special case situations.
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13. Consolidation of Navy and Marine Corps A6-E training
would be entirely feasible under prevailing conditions. It
would be economically and qualitatively beneficial if accom-
plished according to either option A or B. Finally, it would
be advisable in terms of maximizing the efficient and effective




In the introduction to Section II (Evaluation of Relevant
Factors) , the statement was made that any argument for or
against consolidation must involve the three elements essen-
tial to an ideal training environment, as well as relevant
political and economic considerations. The three essential
elements were listed as:/
1) Logistical support adequate to a smooth running,
continuous, and flexible training program./"
2) Proximity to geographical, meteoroligical , and
tactical conditions approximating those in the
particular mission environment./
3) A psychological attitude on the part of the parent
and tenant commands which acknowledges the training
environment to be of primary importance in the
development of all future tactical options./
The relevant fiscal considerations are summarized in
Section III (Costs) and show a positive annual savings that
can be realized under the recommended conditions of consol-
idation./
The political influences on the situation are varied and
subjective. A brief consideration of them prior to an ana-
lytical examination of the trade-offs should be helpful. To
begin with, there was sufficient high level interest in the
attainment of maximum training efficiency to generate two
separate studies of the A-6 proposal within three years.
That interest is directly attributable to the general economic
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constraints placed upon the military budget as a whole since
the end of the Vietnam War.
There is another grouping of political considerations.
It involves the natural objections to consolidation which
were encountered and are thought to be inherent in the par-
ticular organizational branches. The Marine Corps objects
to the loss of a squadron of aircraft and the perceived
decrease in tactical options which would result. They are
also concerned with the loss of initial "service identifi-
cation" by first tour aircrews trained in a consolidated
atmosphere and the loss of operational or mission emphasis
due to perceived variances in mission employment.-"
The primary objection from the Navy noted the additional
logistical, personnel, and management burden which they would
assume with the Marine training requirement.^
In fact, this study indicates that the facility most
closely approximating the "ideal" desired is the Naval Air
Station at Whidbey Island. It indicates that a consolidation
in accordance with the guidelines suggested herein should
result in positive annual economic savings to the Department
of the Navy. It also indicates that consolidation can be
achieved in a manner which minimizes support requirements
and in several instances actually reduces them.-'
Within that framework, the recommendation remains sensi-
tive to a number of influences. They include: alterations
in planned squadron output requirements; variations in
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available aircraft, personnel, and facilities support; and
potential revisions to mission assignments.^
The major trade-off for all of these potential influences
is the stated enhancement of efficient, quality training
which would be realized at apparent savings by consolidation.
The degree to which this concern takes precedence over the
acknowledged objections and possible changes in the prevail-
ing environment is the key to this proposal's ultimate
feasibility.
The Marine Corps' objection to the loss of a squadron
and a command billet is not without some justification. Over
an extended period of time the loss of a squadron v/ill result
in a number of potential commanding officers not receiving
experience from which they and the Marine Corps might benefit.
The Marine Corps will also suffer the loss of a substantial
logistical foundation and the tactical and planning alterna-
tives which it provides.''
When, however, the objection is examined in the light of
current and projected personnel shortages it begins to lose
credibility. The availability of the training squadron at
Cherry Point as a convertible tactical asset is very unlikely
since crisis has historically increased the need for trained
replacement crews and could even require an enlarged training
base. A training squadron cannot simply be redesignated and
sent off to combat whenever events generate the need for
additional assets. It is made up largely of unskilled trainees
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In 202' s particular case, the on-hand instructor quota has
historically been well below even the manning level required
of a tactical squadron.'
Objections built on the concept of "service identifica-
tion" are more difficult to respond to as their specific
value defies exact quantification. It may be significant,
however, to consider the already mixed and presumably suc-
cessful flight training programs presently functioning within
the Naval Aviation community. Moreover, that particular
concept is realistically associated with operational squadrons
rather than training units.'
It is always possible that major changes could occur in
the basic policies governing A-6 training within the Depart-
ment of the Navy. Such changes and the magnitude of them
would probably influence the findings of this thesis and
should be considered by the decision-making organization.*''
While cost estimates indicate a potential annual savings
to be realized from either of the proposals, these estimates
are clearly tied to all other assumptions. Unforeseen
requirements for additional facilities or personnel could
rapidly eliminate the projected savings. It should be con-
sidered, however, that the kind of circumstances that would
radically affect the proposed structure would in all likeli-
hood have similar adverse effects on the current organization.
Since the proposal has been shown to be inherently more
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efficient, it is not unreasonable to assume that it would
remain so under conditions affecting the entire present
structure.
What should be examined is the circumstances under which
the current structure would actually prove to be more econ-
omical than the suggested organization. The point at which
that would occur is thought to be an extreme one in which
the facilities at both Whidbey Island and Oceana would no
longer be responsive to expansion and a third training site
became necessary. In all likelihood the circumstances that
would cause such a situation would probably be sufficiently
catastrophic to invalidate most of the economic considera-
tions prevailing in the current military plan of operation.
Both option A and option B are based on estimated output
requirements over the next five year period. Any decrease
in those levels would serve to enhance the argument in favor
of consolidation. But an unforeseen need to rapidly increase
student output could result in the kind of expansion just
described. For example, option B T s distribution of 25% of
the Marine requirement to NAS, Oceana was based on a planned
decrease in VA-42's forecast delivery rate. Should environ-
mental factors dictate a rapid build-up of either Marine or
Navy crews, Oceana would be restricted for a time by the
numerous structural limitations outlined in Section II. Any
additional needs would, therefore, fall on Whidbey Island
until at least the completion of current MILCON projects
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planned for Oceana. It becomes obvious that consolidation
does affect the overall flexibility of training response
within the A-6 community. Whether that trade-off is suffi-
cient to outweigh the enumerated benefits of the proposal
is difficult to pinpoint. It is the author's contention
that within the context of five-year planning cycles the
contemporary political and socio-economic environment, and
the circumstances noted, it is not sufficient.
The major trade-offs, then, are these:
1) Efficiency vs. Flexibility
The gains in efficiency are considered substantial. They
include savings in annual direct operating expenses, reduced
personnel and aircraft support requirements, and maximum
utilization of the best training aids and evaluation tech-
niques available. The loss in flexibility is thought to be
minimal. It is also considered critical only in the event
of circumstances that would invalidate the basis for the
study.
2) Quality vs. Service Identification
Because of the more concentrated use of the best available
facilities, the resultant increase in readiness percentages
for Marine aircrews, and the more comprehensive training pro-
gram that would be provided for all users, the proposal appears
to enhance the overall quality of the eventual product regard-
less of service affiliation. Weighted against these benefits
is the loss of initial service identification by first
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tour trainees. While the value of that loss is difficult to
quantify, it should be remembered that even under the proposal
the crews would be returning to their individual services for
operational flying. Consequently, the development of identi-
fication would really only be delayed, not lost. The hard,
quantifiable benefits listed appear to justify such a delay.
3) Economic Gain vs. Economic Loss/
The proposed system has been shown to provide positive
benefits. The extent to which adjustments in the proposal
or environmental considerations might erode those benefits
is unknown. It is thought by the author to be minimal within
the five-year planning period. The system currently utilized
represents a continuing economic loss in the face of the
proposal's general adaptability .
^
It is the conclusion of this study that analysis of all
relevant, identifiable factors indicates the advisability of






FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF
NAVY AND MARINE A- 6E FLEET READINESS SQUADRONS
Naval Air Station Oceana supports 23 Regular and 1 Reserve
squadrons with approximately 165 aircraft that includes such
diverse types as the F-14, F-4, F-5, A-6E, TA-4, TC4C, A-4 and
various utility aircraft. An additional squadron (VAQ-33) is
expected to move on board on 5 July 1978 for a period of 30
months while runway work is in progress at NAS Norfolk. The
squadron has 20 aircraft, approximately 60 officers and 550
enlisted personnel. NAS Oceana has a population of 7,852
enlisted, 1154 officers, and 1464 civilians including the per-
sonnel of deployed squadrons. This population is forecast to
increase to 8405 enlisted, 1578 officers, and 1606 civilians
by 1985.
The present facilities available to support Navy A-6E
Fleet Readiness Training and the adequacy of these facilities
to support a 60 percent or 100 percent consolidation of Navy
and Marine replacement training are identified in this
Appendix. Judgements concerning adequacy of present facilities
and adequacy for consolidation requirements were furnished by
the appropriate commands. Military Construction Projects that
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FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF
NAVY AND MARINE A-6E FLEET READINESS SQUADRONS
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island supports 16 Regular and
3 Navy and Marine Reserve squadrons with approximately 150
aircraft of such types as the A-6E, EA-6E, P-3, UH-1N and
several utility helicopters and aircraft. The predominant
aircraft are the A- 6E and EA-6S and the entire complex is
uniquely equipped to support the maintenance and training for
these types. The present population supported by NAS Whidbey
Island including deployed squadrons is 856 officers, 6072
enlisted, 1300 civilians and approximately 11,000 active duty
dependents. The military population is projected to increase
to 7167 in 1981 and remain approximately the same in 1982 and
1983.
The present facilities available to support Navy A-6E
Fleet Readiness Training and the adequacy of these facilities
to support 40 percent or 100 percent consolidation of Navy
and Marine replacement training are identified in this Appendix
Judgements concerning adequacy of present facilities and ade-
quacy for consolidation requirements were furnished by the
appropriate commands. Military Construction Projects that
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PERSONNEL ALLOWANCES AND ON- BOARD STRENGTH OF NAVY
AND MARINE FLEET READINESS SQUADRONS
























* Includes TC4C pilots in Navy squadrons.
# Includes personnel furnished for support, e.g., compartment cleaners,
etc. and personnel furnished to Intermediate Maintenance Activity
(H§MS).
Note: Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance personnel and other station
support required in support of Navy FRS are not charged to
squadron allowance as in the case of VMAT(AW)-202 . VMAT(AW)-202
does receive some support from other commands in the form of
TC4C pilots and A-6E instructors.
There are differences in intermediate maintenance support in the
Marine Corps from the Navy which results in a significant
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Analysis of the various Bombardier/Navigator training
syllabi utilized at the two Navy and one Marine replacement
aircrew training squadrons presented some interesting problems
Initial review made it apparent that a flight -by- flight study
would prove confusing and unproductive due to the subjective
factors involved in the training of a BN as opposed to a pilot
There were several philosophies observable in the content
of the various syllabi. Essentially the same material is
being taught in each squadron. (Notable exceptions are Mining
techniques, being taught by the Navy, and the use of the
RABFAC beacon bombing method, which is heavily emphasized by
the Marine Corps.) However, differences do appear in the
manner in which certain areas are covered. One approach is
to present all of the aspects and ramifications of a partic-
ular subspecialty, say, systems navigation, and gradually
increase the difficulty factors involved. This appears to be
characteristic of the Navy approach (in general). The Marine
unit displays a tendency to cover one or two phases of a given
subject in depth and then move on to the next with scheduled
reviews or reemphasis later in the syllabus. Consequently,
an analysis on the basis of phase rather than flight-by- fl ight
seemed more in order.
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The results of that approach are contained in the next
several pages. It is structured to permit comparisons between
VA-128 and VA-42, as well as emphasizing VMAT (AW) - 202 ' s rela-
tionship to both the Navy units. Comparability of the flight




Total Flight Time per Student
Actual Time on the Equipment per Student
Instructor Hours
Instructor Hours per Student
The categories are weighted equally, thereby permitting
the user to manipulate the data according to his particular
needs
.
Overall, comparability was found to fall within the follow-
ing ranges for Category I BN ' s
:
VMAT (AW) -202 to 128 VMAT (AW) -2 02 to 4 2
From .917 to 1.222 and From .389 to 1.124
It should be noted that fi\r e categories of training were
excluded. They are: Visual Weapons, Aerial Refueling, TPQ,
FMLP , and Carrier Quals.
Visual weapons flights are flown by both squadrons.
VMAT(AW) - 202, however, flies them with one student and one
instructor while the Navy syllabus, which is lengthier in that
regard, uses two students. The remaining four topics are unique
to one or the other service — (TPQ and Air Refuel to the Marine
Corps, and FMLP and CAR QUALS to the Navy). Their compara-
bility is therefore zero.
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Regarding the specific subjects covered within each
syllabus section, there is almost total comparability even
though the respective titles, order of presentation, and
instructional technique vary considerably. Notable exceptions
are, again, Mining and RABFAC training. This difference may
be due to logistic factors more than anything else. Based on
the historical precedent of Marine A-6's mining Haiphong
Harbor, the opportunity to expose Marines to that particular
type of attack (which consolidation would present) may be a
minor, but none the less, relevant factor. Likewise, the Navy
interest in RABFAC techniques has been rising steadily over
the last few years and appears to have been held up more by
the lack of availability of actual transponders than by any
disagreement about its validity as an attack mode.
Finally, there are one or two points evidenced by the
study which deserve further, more detailed consideration.
There is more than one example of substantial differences in
the perceived value of specific training methods among the
three squadrons. The respective approaches to the System
Weapons Phase (System Ordnance Phase for 202) illustrates
the point. "VA-128 employs 4 TC4C flights in this section
while 202 uses a total of 6. VA-42, however, incorporates
only 1 TC46 hop in their syllabus for this phase, preferring
to rely on nine (9) A-6 flights. (VA-128 also specifies 9
A-6 hops while 202 has 6.) Assuming that all three squadrons
77

have been producing essentially satisfactory B/N's over the
years, it becomes apparent that no one method is especially
superior to another. This allows for maximum flexibility in
the consideration of consolidated flight training.
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TC4C FLIGHTS - VA-128
NAVIGATION PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 8
TIME PER FLIGHT - 4 HRS.
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT - 2
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER STUDENT - 32
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT PER STUDENT - 16
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 32
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER STUDENT - 16
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS - 64












LOCK-ON PROCEDURES (FIXED AND MOVING)
FULL COMPUTER STEERING FUNCTIONS
TROUBLESHOOTING MALFUNCTIONS
CHECKRIDE
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES FROM 128 OR 202: NO RABFAC PROCEDURES,
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TC4C FLIGHTS - VA-42
NAVIGATION PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 9
TIME PER FLIGHT - 3.5 HRS.
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT - 2
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER STUDENT - 31.5
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT PER STUDENT - 15.75
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 31.5
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER STUDENT - 15.75
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS - 65











NAVIGATION PROCEDURES AND SCOPE DISPLAY SELECTION
USE OF RADAR PREDICTIONS
DEVELOPMENT OF FUNDAMENTALS AND SCOPE PROFICIENCY
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES:
NO RABFAC PROCEDURES
THE LAST FLIGHT IN THE PHASE IS REQUIRED TO BE "DEMANDING"
BUT IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED AS A CHECKRIDE.
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TC4C FLIGHTS - VMAT-202
NAVIGATION PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 9
TIME PER FLIGHT - 3.5
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT - 3
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER STUDENT - 31.5
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT PER STUDENT - 10.5
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 31.5
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER STUDENT - 10.5
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS - 63
PLANE CAPTAIN HOURS - 31.5
SUBJECTS COVERED:
SEARCH RADAR TUNING .AND OPERATION
INS ALIGNMENT
RADAR MALFUNCTIONS
COMPUTER STEERING IN THE D.R. MODE
COMPUTER READOUTS OF ADC, INS, AND DOPPLER
DEGRADED MODES
NMATSZ/DNMATSZ
ELEVATION LOCKS AND READOUTS






TENDENCY TOWARD A MORE SPECIFIED CONTENT.
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TC4C FLIGHTS - 128
SYSTEM WEAPONS PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 4
TIME PER FLIGHT - Varies (2,3 § 4 hrs.)
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT - 2
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER STUDENT - 12
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT PER STUDENT - 6
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 12
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER STUDENT - 6
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS - 24
PLANE CAPTAIN HOURS - 12
SUBJECTS COVERED:
SIMULATED ATTACKS - ALL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
MINING ATTACKS
COMPLEX ATTACKS
SYSTEM NAVIGATION AND PRACTICE TO AND FROM TARGETS
SIMULATED ATTACKS ON THE SPOKANE RBS
CHECKRIDE INVOLVING DIFFICULT TARGETS, DISTRACTIONS,
MALFUNCTIONS AND SIMULATED EMERGENCIES.
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES:
AVAILABILITY OF SPOKANE RBS
MINING
EMPHASIS ON COMPLEX TARGETS
NOTE : EMPHASIS IS ON EXPOSURE TO THE TOTAL A-6 MISSION. ALL PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY ORDNANCE DELIVERIES ARE COVERED. ACCORDING TO PREVAILING CONDI-
TIONS AND CONSTRAINTS THE TC4C PHASE WILL ALSO INCLUDE AND PRACTICE CREW
COORDINATION, COCKPIT AWARENESS (AIRMANSHIP), TARGETING, WEAPONRY AND
DEGRADED SYSTEMS OPERATION. MINING, MOVING TARGETS, COMPLEX AND TERRAIN
TARGET PROCEDURES ARE ALL COVERED. THIS REQUIRES THE USE OF AIMPOINTS,
CHECKPOINTS AND SYSTEM PROCEDURES.
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TC4C FLIGHTS - 42
SYSTEM WEAPONS PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 1
TIME PER FLIGHT - 3.5
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT - 3
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER STUDENT - 3.5
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT PER STUDENT - 1.17
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 3.5
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER STUDENT - 1.17
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS - 7
PLANE CAPTAIN HOURS - 3.5
SUBJECTS COVERED:
FAMILIARIZATION WITH TARGET PATTERN AND PROCEDURES
DEMONSTRATE ATTACK PROCEDURES AND SYSTEM ATTACK MODES
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES:
RAW TIME FACTOR UNDER THE DIRECT GUIDANCE OF AN INSTRUCTOR B/N
IN THE ATTACK, OR WEAPONS SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT.
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TC4C FLIGHTS - 202
RADAR TARGET IDENTIFICATION PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 6
TIME PER FLIGHT - 3.5
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT - 3
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER STUDENT - 21
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT PER STUDENT - 7
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 21
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER STUDENT - 7
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS - 42




USE OF OFFSET AIMPOINTS (IMPLIED IN 128* s)
TARGET COMPLEX BREAKUP
COMPLEX ATTACKS





EMPHASIS ON OVERALL ATTACK PROCEDURES AS OPPOSED TO
COMPLEX ATTACKS.
NOTE : THE STUDENT IS INTRODUCED TO AND PRACTICES ALL PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY ATTACKS. HE CONTINUES TO GAIN EXPERIENCE IN GENERAL AIRMAN-
SHIP, TARGETING, USE OF THE WEAPONS SYSTEM AND DEGRADED SYSTEMS OPERATION,




A6 FLIGHTS - 128
FAM STAGE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 2
TIME PER FLIGHT - 2
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT (TOTAL) - 4






TOUCH AND GO PATTERN
INSTRUMENT ROUND ROBIN






A6 FLIGHTS - 42
FAM STAGE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 1
TIME PER FLIGHT - 1.5
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT (TOTAL) - 1.5











A6 FLIGHTS - 202
FAM AND INSTRUMENT STAGE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS -. 4
TIME PER FLIGHT - 2.5
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT (TOTAL) - 10




















A6 FLIGHTS - 128
NAVIGATION PHASE
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS (1 VISUAL-FORM, 3 SYSTEMS) - 4
TIME PER FLIGHT (2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 3) -
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT (TOTAL) - 10.5
INSTRUMENT HOURS - 10.5
SUBJECTS COVERED:
FORMATION FLYING
VISUAL NAVIGATION - LOW LEVEL
HAND AND ARM SIGNALS




LOW LEVEL SYSTEM NAVIGATION
TERRAIN CLEARANCE USING SEARCH RADAR AND SRTC






A6 FLIGHTS - 42
NAVIGATION AND RADAR TARGET IDENTIFICATION PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 10
TIME PER FLIGHT - (1-2.0, 9-2.5)
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT (TOTAL) - 24.5




IDENTIFICATION AND BREAKUP OF COMPLEX TARGETS
RANGING FROM EASY TO VERY DIFFICULT
LOW LEVEL/HIGH SPEED SYSTEM AND VISUAL NAVIGATION (COMBINED)
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
NO FORMATION (ANYWHERE IN THE SYLLABUS)
* NOTE: THE SYLLABUS IS UNSPECIFIC AS TO CONTENT BUT IT CAN BE
REASONABLY ASSUMED THAT IT PARALLELS 128, AT LEAST
ROUGHLY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FORMATION FLYING, WHICH
ONE WOULD EXPECT TO FIND SPECIFIED.
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A6 FLIGHTS - 202
FORMATION, VISUAL NAVIGATION AND SYSTEM TACTICS PHASES:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - (2 VISUAL, 2 FORMATION, 4 SYSTAC) 8
TIME PER FLIGHT - (2-2.0 and 6-2.5)
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT (TOTAL) - • 19
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 19
SUBJECTS COVERED:
FORMATION FLYING - DAY AND NIGHT
SECTION TACTICS
SECTION APPROACHES
HAND AND ARM SIGNALS
LOW LEVEL/HIGH SPEED VISUAL NAVIGATION
LOW AND MEDIUM SYSTEM NAVIGATION
ST. PATH ATTACKS
TERRAIN CLEARANCE





CONTINUATION OF ATTACK PROCEDURES
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A6 FLIGHTS - 128
SYSTEM WEAPONS PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 9
TIME PER FLIGHT - (1 - 2.0, 4 - 2.5, 4 - 3.0)
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT (TOTAL) - 24
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 24
SUBJECTS COVERED:
ALL SIGNIFICANT TYPES OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY METHODS OF
ORDNANCE DELIVERY
CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AND EXPOSURE TO HIGH SPEED NAVIGATION,
ALL WEATHER TERRAIN CONTOUR FLYING, CREW COORDINATION,











A6 FLIGHTS - 42
SYSTEM WEAPONS PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 9
TIME PER FLIGHT - C6-2.0, 3-2.5)
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT (TOTAL) - 19.5
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 19.5
SUBJECTS COVERED:
ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS 128 IN BOTH INTENT AND CONTENT.
NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS ARE: NO MENTION OF EITHER MINING OR AMTI,
AND THE INCLUSION OF SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED, PLANNED
CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL WEAPONS DELIVERY STRIKES.
THIS SEEMS TO DISPLAY SOME OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES
IN INSTRUCTIONAL METHODOLOGY MENTIONED IN THE INTRODUCTION.
OVERALL COMPARABILITY STILL HIGH.
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A6 FLIGHTS - 202
SYSTEM ORDNANCE PHASE:
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 6
TIME PER FLIGHT - 1.5
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT (TOTAL) - 9
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 9
SUBJECTS COVERED:
STRAIGHT PATH AND STRAIGHT PATH DIVE ATTACKS
COP CHECKS
STRAIGHT PATH USING RABFAC OR OAP '
s
GENERAL AND ROCKET ATTACKS
NIGHT ATTACKS
AMTI (SIMULATED)
STRAIGHT PATH RABFAC AT NIGHT
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES:






VISUAL WEAPONS - 128 42 202
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 8 4 2
HOURS PER FLIGHT - NA NA 1.5
TOTAL HOURS - 12 6 3
INSTRUCTOR HOURS NONE NONE 3
SUBJECTS - NA NA 30 DIVE
30 RKTS.
AERIAL REFUELING - NO NO SCHED BUT RARELY FLOWN
1 FLT - 1 HR
TPQ -
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - NO NO 1
HOURS PER FLIGHT - 1.5
TOTAL HOURS - 1.5
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - 1.5
TACTICS -
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 5 1 NONE
HOURS PER FLIGHT - NA 1.5 NONE
TOTAL HOURS - 6.5 1.5 NONE
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - NONE NONE NONE
FCLP's -
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 14 NA NONE
HOURS PER FLIGHT - 1 NA NONE
TOTAL HOURS - 14 5 NONE
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - NONE NONE NONE
CARRIER QUALS -
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS - 4 NA NONE
HOURS PER FLIGHT - 2 NA NONE
TOTAL HOURS - 8 S NONE
INSTRUCTOR HOURS - NONE NONE NONE





128 % 42 % 202 %/128 %/42
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 8 .888 9 1.000 9 1.125 1.000
TIME PER FLIGHT 4 1.000 3.5 .875 3.5 .875 1.000
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT 2 1.000 2 1.000 3 1.500 1.500
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER
STUDENT 32 1.000 31.5 .984 31.5 .984 1.000
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
PER STUDENT 16 1.000 15.75 .984 10.5 .656 .667
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 32 1.000 31.5 .984 31.5 .984 1.000
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER
STUDENT 16 1.000 15.75 .984 10.5 .656 .667
TOTAL CREW HOURS 64 1.000 65 .984 65 .984 1.000
PLANE CAPTAIN HOURS 32 1.000 31.5 .984 51.5 .984 1.000
SYSTEM WEAPONS PHASE
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 4 1.000 1 .250 6 1.500 6.000
TIME PER FLIGHT V 5
,
5 5.5 Varies 1 000
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT 2 667 5 1.000 3 1.500 1 000
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER
STUDENT 12 1 000 3. 5 .292 21 1.750 6 000
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
PER STUDENT 6 1 000 1. 17 .195 7 1.167 5 983
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 12 1 000 3
.
5 .292 21 1.750 6 000
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER
STUDENT 6 1 000 1 17 .195 7 1.167 5 983
TOTAL CREW HOURS 24 1 000 7 .292 42 1.750 6 000




FAM STAGE (FAM AND INSTRUMENT STAGE FOR 202)
128 0. 42 0,"0 202 %/128 %/42
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 2 1.000 1 .500 4 2.000 4.000
TIME PER FLIGHT 2 1.000 1.5 .750 2.5 1.250 1.667
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
(TOTAL) 4 1.000 1.5 .375 10 2.500 6.667
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 4 1.000 1.5 .375 10 2.500 6.667
NAVIGATION PHASE (NAV. AND RADAR TGT. IDENTIFICATION PHASE FOR VA-42)
(FORMATION, VISUAL NAV. AND SYSTEM TACTICS FOR 202)
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 4 .400 10 1.000 8 2 000 .800
TIME PER FLIGHT V V Varies
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
(TOTAL) 10.5 .429 24.5 1.000 19 1 800 .776
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 10.5 .429 24.5 1.000 19 1 800 .776
SYSTEM WEAPONS PHASE (SYSTEM ORDNANCE PHASE FOR 202)
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 9 1.000 9 1.000 6 .667 .667
TIME PER FLIGHT V V 1.5
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
(TOTAL) 24 1.000 19.5 .815 9 .375 .462
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 24 1.000 19.5 .815 9 .575 .462
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ANALYSIS BY AIRCRAFT - ALL FLIGHTS
TC4C
128 % 42 % 202 %/128 %/42
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 12 1.000 10 .833 15 1.250 1.500
TIME PER FLIGHT V V 3.5
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT 2 .952 2.1 1.000 3 1.500 1.430
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME
PER STUDENT 44 1.000 35 .795 52.5 1.193 1.500
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
PER STUDENT 22 1.000 16.92 .769 17.5 .795 1.034
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 44 1.000 35 .795 52.5 1.195 1.500
INSTRUCTOR HOURS
PER STUDENT 22 1.000 16.67 .757 17.5 .795 1.049
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS 88 1.000 70 .795 105 1.193 1.500
PLANE CAPTAIN HOURS 44 1.000 35 .795 52.5 1.193 1.500
A6 (EXCLUDES VIS. WEAPONS, AIR. REFUEL, TPQ, FCLP, CAR. QUALS
.
)
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 15 .750 20 1.000 18 1.200 .900
TIME PER FLIGHT V V V
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
(TOTAL) 38.5 .846 45.5 1.000 38 .987 .835
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 38.5 .846 45.5 1.000 38 .987 .835
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ANALYSIS BY PHASE - ALL FLIGHTS - TC4C AND A6
FAM STAGE (TAM AND INSTRUMENT STAGE FOR 202)
128 % 42 % 202 %/128 %/42
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 2 1.000 1 .500 4 2.000 4.000
TIME PER FLIGHT 2 1.000 1.5 .750 2.5 1.250 1.667
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
(TOTAL) 4 1.000 1.5 .375 10 2.500 6.667
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 4 1.000 1.5 .375 10 2.500 6.667
NAVIGATION PHASE (NAV. .AND RADAR TGT. , IDENTIFICATION PHASE FOR 42)
(FORM, VIS. NAV. SYS. TACTICS PHASE FOR 202)
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 12 .631 19 1.000 17 1.416 .89'
TIME PER FLIGHT
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER
STUDENT 42.5 .759 56 1.000 50.5 1.188 .901
V V V
1/2 1/2 1/3
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
PER STUDENT 26 5 .658 40 25 1 .000 29 5 1 113 .752
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 42 5 .759 56 1 000 50. 5 1 188 .901
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER
STUDENT 26 5 . 658 40. 25 1 .000 29 5 1 115 .732
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS 74 5 .851 87. 5 1 .000 82 1 100 .937
PLANE CAPTAIN HOURS 32 1.000 31. 5 .984 51 5 984 1.000
SYSTEM WEAPONS PHASE (SYSTEM ORDNANCE PHASE FOR 202)
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 13 1 000 10 .769 12 .923 1 200
TIME PER FLIGHT 2-4 2-3.5 1.5-3 .5
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT 1-2 1-2-3 1-3
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER
STUDENT 36 1 000 25 .638 50 .853 1 304
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
PER STUDENT 30 1 000 20.67 .689 16 . 533 774
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 36 1 000 23 .638 50 .833 1 304
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER
STUDENT 50 1 000 20.67 .689 16 .533 774
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS 48 1 000 26.5 .552 51 1 .062 1 924
PLANE CAPTAIN HOURS 12 1 000 3.5 .292 21 1 .750 6 000
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ANALYSIS OF THE FLIGHT SYLLUBUS - ALL FLIGHTS - ALL AIRCRAFT
128 % 42 % 202 %/128 %/42
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 27 .900 50 1.000 55 1.222 1.100
TIME PER FLIGHT V V V
STUDENTS PER FLIGHT 1/2 1/3 1/3
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME PER
STUDENT 82.5 1 .000 80.5 .975 90.5 1.096 1.124
TIME ON THE EQUIPMENT
PER STUDENT 60.5 .969 62.42 1.000 55.5 .917 .889
INSTRUCTOR HOURS 82.5 1 .000 80.5 .975 90.5 1.096 1.124
INSTRUCTOR HOURS PER
STUDENT 60.5 .969 62.42 1.000 55.5 .917 .889
TOTAL AIRCREW HOURS 88 1 .000 70 .795 105 1.195 1.500
PLANE CAPTAIN HOURS 44 1 .000 35 .795 52.5 1.195 1.500
COMPARABILITY RUNS FROM:
202 to 128 202 to 4;




SQUADRON SORTIES STUDENT HOURS AIRCRAFT HOURS
DAY/NIGHT DAY/NIGHT DAY/NIGHT
NAVIGATION STAGE
128 5/10 11/0 5/6
42 ' 5/0 14.5/0 7.5/7
SYSTEM PHASE
128 6/1 16/3 17/2
42 6/1 15/2.5 14/3.5
FMLP'S AND CARRIER QUALS ARE OPTIONAL IN 42
FMLP 1/4 1/4 NOT CREDITED
CAR. QUAL. 2/2 4/4 NOT CREDITED
128 INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING:
VISUAL WEAPONS 8/0 12/0 12/0
TACTICS 4/1 5.5/1 6.5/0
FCLP's 4/10 4/10 14/0
CAR. QUALS. 2/2 4/4 8/0






THE MARINE CORPS TRANSITION AND CONVERSION SYLLABI ARE IDENTICAL.
THE REFRESHER SYLLABUS IS AS FOLLOWS:
SORTIES TIME PER FLIGHT TOTAL HOURS
SYSTEM TACTICS - 4
SYSTEM ORDNANCE - 6







CARRIER QUALS, FMLP's, AND TACTICS ARE INTRODUCED AT A LATER STAGE
OF TRAINING AFTER ASSIGNMENT TO THE TACTICAL SQUADRONS.
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USING 100 PERCENT AS THE BASE FIGURE, COMPARABILITY OF ALL FACTORS
FELL WITHIN THE FOLLOWING RANGE:
VMAT(AW)-202 COMPARED TO VA-128 :
From a Minimum of 91.7% to a Maximum of 122.2% -
The Mean = 104.96%
The Variance = 1.383864%
The Standard Deviation = 13.1523000%
Average Comparability equalled 95%.
VMAT(AW)-202 COMPARED TO VA-42 :
From a Minimum of 88.9% to a Maximum of 112.4% -
The Mean = 102.52%
The Variance = 1.244376%
The Standard Deviation = 12.471848%
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A-6E AIRCRAFT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT USMC REPLACEMENT PILOT





100% USMC A_ 6E
Aircraft Hours H Aircraft Hours H Aircraft Hours H
1846 2770 4616 11
* Based on 35 flight hours per month for A-6E aircraft
TABLE IV




















rNo additional TC4C's requested based on 3 system aircraft being




TOTAL AIRCRAFT HOURS FOR 100 PERCENT
CONSOLIDATION OF USN/USMC FRS
(USMC in Navy Categories)











4175 1323 3525 1091
Total Navy: 5498
Total USMC: 4616
Total A-6E aircraft hours: 10,114
Percent increase A- 6E aircraft hours for USMC: 84%










Total USMC: 7 55
Total TC4C aircraft hours: 1654
Percent increase TC4C aircraft hours for USMC: 86%
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The introduction of the 2F114, A6-E, Weapon System Trainer
greatly increases the flexibility of the responsible units to
complete their training in an efficient and effective manner.
It can be incorporated into existing programs in one of three
fundamental ways:
1) AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR SPECIFIED FLIGHTS
2) TO AUGMENT ALREADY EXISTING PROGRAMS, or
3) AS A COMBINATION OF THE FIRST TWO.
That the system, as currently specified, could be used to
substitute for actual flight time is of little doubt. The
extent to which it should be so used is a much more difficult
question and one which deserves a separate, detailed cost/
benefit analysis. The tables which follow are meant only to
indicate those flights which could, feasibly, be substituted
for in the 2F114. It is not a recommendation.
It is recognized that the unique and unpredictable nature
of actual flight can never be totally simulated and that any
squadron would be understandably reluctant to unnecessarily
forfeit real hours. Given that constraint however, it remains
possible to particularize those hops which lend themselves to





At the same time it is recommended that any plan to imple-
ment the 2F114 be based in the methods of flexible budgeting.
Specifically, levels of substitution could be developed on the
basis of projected availability of funds for flight time. For
example, Level One might represent those few flights which
would be substituted for, given a slightly less than optimal
level of funding. Each succeeding level would represent plans
for the next degraded possibility.
There should be obvious reluctance to sacrifice any flights
involving the actual, graded delivery of live or practice ord-
nance. In this same regard, the more difficult areas of system
utilization, such as Search Radar Terrain Clearance, should be
given higher priorities in the actual environment.
The second suggested use for the 2F114 is as an augmenta-
tion device for current syllabi. As such, it would serve a
particularly useful function in areas dedicated to familiar-
ization, emergency procedures, and functioning under stressful
and degraded circumstances. Its usefulness as an augment, and
especially as a substitute in systems navigation and weapons
segments, will be directly related to the quality and relia-
bility of its system, and particularly its radar simulations.
Finally, it is felt that the device will find its maximum
efficient utilization in a program combining those factors





SYLLABUS FLIGHT AIRCRAFT COMPATABLE REMARKS






NN-5 TC4C X ASSUMING AMTI/LM
NN-6 TC4C X
NN-7 A6 VISUAL NAV.
NN-8 A6 X
NN-9 A6 REQUIRES SRTC PRAC
NN-10 A6 X
NN-11 A6 TERRAIN CLEARANCE
NN-12 TC4C X
NS-1 TC4C X
NS-2 A6 ORDNANCE HOP
NS-3 A6 MINING/AMTI
NS-4 A6 AMTI WITH ORD.
NS-5 TC4C X
NS-6 A6 ORDNANCE HOP
NS-7 A6 ORD. HOP W/SRTC
NS-8 TC4C X
NS-9 A6 ORD. HOP W/TOT
NS-10 A6 ALL WX. LOW LEVEL
NS-11 A6 X
NS-12 A6 X









SYLLABUS1 FLIGHT AIRCRAFT COMPATABLE REMARKS
















NR-5 TC4C IBN's check on RBN
NR-6 A6 X
NR-7 A6 • SYS/VISUAL
NR-8 A6 SYS/VI SUAL/ORDNANCE






NS-7 A 6 ORDNANCE
NS-8 A6 ORD/CONVENTIONAL SK
NS-9 A6 SRTC LOW LEVEL
NS - 1 A6 SPECIAL WEAPS. STK.








SYLLABUS FLIGHT AIRCRAFT COMPATABLE REMARKS


























RTI-6 TC4C • CHECKRIDE
















DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center, Atlantic
Norfolk, Virginia 23511





From: Commanding Officer, Navy Manpower and Material Analysis
Center, Atlantic
To: Director, Training Analysis and Evaluation Group, Orlando,
Florida 32813
Subj : Manpower Impact Report ; forwarding of
Ref : (a) Training Analysis and Evaluation Group ltr dtd 30 May 78
End: (1) Manpower Impact Report on Consolidation of USMC Training
at VA-42
1. As requested by reference (a), manpower analysts at
NAVMMACLANT conducted an in-depth study of the manpower
implications of consolidating USMC pilot and bombardier/
navigator training at VA-42. The study focused on manpower
impacts in organizational and intermediate maintenance, pilot
and B/N instruction, FRAMP instruction, and squadron admini-
stration.









MANPOWER IMPACT REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION OF USMC TRAINING AT VA-42
1. Off icer Increment
a. Quantity by designator
100% 60% 50%
DESIGNATOR Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation
1310 12 7 6
1320 12 7 6
Total 24 14 12
b. Quality by Rank
RANK 100% 6 0% 50%
0-4 2 1 1
0-3 22 13 11
2. Enlisted Increment
a. Organizational L<3vel Maintenance
(1) Quanti ty by Rating
RATING 100% 60% 5 0%
AD 13 8 7
AE 14 8 7
AK 2 1 1
AME 6 4 3
AMH 11 6 6
AMS 18 12 10
AO 10 6 5
AQ 14 8 7
AT 13 7 7
AZ 1
PR 2 1 1
APO 9 6 4
AN 27 17 14











a. Organizational Level Maintenance (Cont'd)
(2) Quality by Paygrade












(1) Quantity by Rating

















PAYGRADE 100% 60% 50%
E-6 2 1 1
E-5 6 5 4
E-4 6 2 2
FRAMP Instructors by Rate
RATE 100% 60% 50%
AD1 1
AE1 1 1 1
AME2 1 1
AOl 1
AQ1 1 1 1
AT 2 1
APOl 1 1 1




NOTE: All FRAMP instructors have a secondary NEC of 9502
d. Administrative Support
(1) Quantity by Function
FUNCTION 100$ 60% 50%
Clerical 8 5 4
Facilities Maint. 2 11
10 6 5
NOTE: "Clerical" includes all administrative functions
normally handled by YN ' s and PN ' s in a Navy squadron
(2) Quality by Paygrade
3.


















a. Officers: + 24 + 14 + 12 + 10
b. Enlisted: + 175 + 103 + 88 + 71
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY




From: Director, Training Analysis and Evaluation Group,
Orlando, Florida 32813
To: Navy Manpower and Material Analysis Center, Atlantic
(Code 72), NAS Norfolk, Virginia 23571
Ref: (a) CNO 061410Z April 78
(b) FONECON between Mr. P. G. Scott and LCDR Graff
of 2 2 May 78
Subj : Request for Manpower Impact Report
1. TAEG has been tasked by CNO to study the feasibility of
consolidating USN/USMC A-6E training.
2. Please provide the manpower impact which would result in
case of the following actions:
a. One hundred percent of USMC P/BN training transferred
to VA 42 utilizing the existing USN syllabus.
b. Sixty percent of USMC P/BN training transferred to
VA42 utilizing the existing USN syllabus.
c. Fifty percent of USMC P/BN training transferred to
VA 42 utilizing the existing USN syllabus.
As requested in the referenced telecon, the following data
is provided. This data represents 100% of USMCA-6E training.




32 Pilots @ 97.36



















Subj : Request for Manpower Impact Report
TAEG:PGS
30 May 1978
(2) TC4C Hours Pilots Yearly Hours
Cat I 32 Pilots @ 5 =160
Cat II 8 Pilots @ 5 =24
B/N
Cat I 25 @ 22 = 506
Cat II 9 @ 9 =
_8_1
Total TC4C Hours Annually - 771
Number of TC4C A/C required based on 80 flight hours per
month = .8.
3. The manpower impact data is necessary for the completion
of the A-6E consolidation study.
A. F. SMODE
Copy to:
CNO OP- 124 (LCDR Huber)
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MANPOWER IMPACT REPORT ON
CONSOLIDATION OF USMC TRAINING AT VA-42
Officer Increment
a. Quantity by designator
100% 60% 50% 40%
DESIGNATOR Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation Consolidation
1310 12 7 6 5
1320 12 7 6 5
Total 24 14 12 10
b . Quality by Rank
RANK 100% 60% 5 0% 40%
0-4 2 1 1 1
0-3 22 13 11 9
Enlisted Increment
a. Organizational Level Maintenance
(1) Quantity by Rating
RATING 100% 6 0% 50% 4 0%
AD 15 8 7 6
AE 14 8 7 6
AK 9L 1 1 1
AME 6 4 3 5
AMH 11 6 6 5
AMS 18 12 10 8
AO 10 6 5 4
AQ 14 8 7 6
AT 13 7 7 6
AZ 1
PR 2 1 1 1
APO 9 6 4 4
AN 27 17 14 6




25 5 5 4
10 6 6 4
23 13 11 9
30 16 15 12
43 27 21 18
27 17 14 9
Enlisted Increment (Cont'd)
a. Organizational Level Maintenance (Cont'd)
(2) Quality by Paygrade






















(2) Quality by Paygrade
100% 60% 50% 40%
2 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1
1 1
7L 1 1 1
5 3 3 3
1


















2. Enlisted Increment (Cont'd)













1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1




All FRAMP instructors have a secondary NEC of 9502
Administrative Support











"Clerical" includes all administrative functions
normally handled by YN ' s and PN ' s in a Navy squadron
(2) Quality by Paygrade




















60% 50%100% 4 0%
a. Officers: + 24 + 14 + 12 + 10





Cost estimates have been compiled for those options
deemed feasible within the context of this study. Conse-
quently, no cost figures are provided for VA-42 at Oceana
regarding the absorption of either 100% or 60% of the Marine
training requirement as those possibilities are considered
untenable in light of present and projected conditions
through 1981. The options which have been found to be real-
istic and deserving of further analysis are:
A. VA-128 absorbing 100% of the Marines, or
B. VA-128 absorbing 75% and VA-42 absorbing 25%.
Option B is based on the assumption that VA-42 will
experience a currently projected decrease in the number of
Navy students input to the squadron. That decrease is expected
to amount to a total of 17 Replacement Pilots and Bombardier/
Navigators. That figure corresponds to approximately 25% of
the annual Marine replacement personnel requirement and is
therefore assumed that VA-42 could incorporate that element
into its present program with only minor disturbances.
Relevant costs for this study are considered to be those
increases required or savings permitted by the proposed options
A third possibility is contingent upon the completion of
projected military construction projects pertaining to VA-42
at Oceana by or during 1981. It is:
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VA-128 absorbing 40% and VA-42 absorbing 60%
Due to the reliance of this option on the stated contin-
gency and the high probability of significant changes in all
or most of the other relevant variables during the interim,
no cost figures will be attempted for that option at this
time.
COST CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS
FACILITIES
1. The Total Cost of Facilities - the acquisition and
refurbishing which are necessary for implementation,
as well as similar savings realized by the adoption
of the proposal.
2. The Annual Cost of Operation and Maintenance of
Facilities Per Square Foot - includes operation, main-
tenance, janitorial service, utilities, etc.
3. Total Square Feet Occupied by the Unit.
4. The Replacement Cost - those facilities which do not
involve readily estimable operations or maintenance
costs, such as ramp space.
PERSONNEL
1. Instructor Costs
2. Support Personnel Costs
3. Administrative Personnel Costs
All personnel costs will be tabulated on the basis of
billet costs associated with the particular option. Because
billet costs inherently comprise substantially more than just
pay and benefits, care has been taken throughout this section




1. The costs associated with transporting student pilots
and bombardiers/navigators from their point of initial
training to the Fleet Replacement Squadron and to their
ultimate duty station.
2. The costs associated with completing the Fleet Replace-
ment Syllabus, such as per diem cost on Temporary Duty
Under Instruction CTEMDUINS) orders.
3. Permanent change of station (PCS) costs including
family travel.
AIRCRAFT COSTS
1. Investment costs for A-6E aircraft and TC4C aircraft.
2. The annual cost of operating the aircraft required to
complete the stipulated training under the particular
proposal being considered.
3. Personnel costs associated with aircraft operations and
maintenance have been extracted from this section to
avoid double counting. They are included in the billet
costs under PERSONNEL.
ORDNANCE COSTS. Those increases or decreases in ordnance
costs under the particular proposal are:
1. Ordnance dedicated to pilot training.
2. Ordnance dedicated to B/N training.
3. Cost of ordnance (taken from the 1975 study) plus
20 percent increase for inflation.
INCREMENTAL COST. The incremental cost (or savings) realized
from implementation of the option. Incremental costs equal
the change in cost for facilities, personnel, travel, aircraft
and ordnance cost.
FACILITIES COST. All facilities costs are based on those
projected savings or expenses to be realized from incorpora-
tion of the proposed options. They are composed of investment
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costs (in those instances where additions are assumed neces-
sary) and annual operating and maintenance costs. and M
costs are computed by multiplying the annual cost per square
foot of operating and maintaining the specific facilities
(this information was obtained from the respective authorities
at each location) times the amount of square footage occupied
by the respective units. Additionally, dollar values were
assigned to ramp space on the basis of replacement costs,
and acquisition costs were estimated in accordance with
available expertise. The ramp space released at MCAS Cherry
Point should negate a need for new ramp construction.
With respect to VMAT (AW) - 202 , all costs detailed are
viewed as incremental savings to be realized from consolida-
tion. Elimination of the A-6E training function at Cherry
Point frees associated assets for use as the tenant command
sees fit. No attempt was made to completely evaluate all of
the possible opportunity costs which consolidation would
allow. Instead, a more useful and realistic value is assigned
to those assets in terms of savings chargeable to the training
function.
Regarding Option B, as with all other cost calculations
presented, it is assumed that VA-42 would experience no addi-
tional facilities- related expenses in training 25 percent of
the annual Marine requirement, assuming that the projected




Cost Per Square Foot of Operating and Maintaining
Facilities - $1.43
Total Square Footage Occupied - 36,640
Incremental Savings on Annual Direct Facilities
Costs - $52,395
Total Ramp Space Occupied - 18,000 Square Yards
Replacement Cost Per Square Yard
(from the 1975 study) - $30.00
Investment Savings on Ramp Space - $540,000
An exact valuation of the equipment assigned to VMAT(AW)-202
facilities is not attempted due to time constraints. It should
be noted, however, that this would constitute a further savings.
VA-128
In accordance with the Facilities Requirements for Con-
solidation of Navy and Marine A-6E Fleet Readiness Squadrons
,
Table II, VA-128 projects the following resource needs:
Option A or B:
1. An additional temporary or portable line shack structure
2. An enlarged ordnance shack capacity.
Conversations with pertinent sources at NAS Whidbey Island
indicated that acquisition of a Butler Building or a double
wide trailer would serve both needs. Cost of such a structure
is estimated at $25,000. Associated facilities operations
and maintenance costs are based on square footage of 1440 and




Investment Cost - $25,000




PERSONNEL SUPPORT COSTS. Section IV, Personnel Support
Requirements, Table 7, presented the combined USN/USMC Billet
Allowances/Onboard Comparison. The estimated annual personnel
cost reduction based on allowances is shown in Table I and
is approximately 3 million dollars. The estimated annual per-
sonnel cost reduction based on current VA-128 and VMAT(AW)-202
onboard count is shown in Table II and is approximately .85
million dollars.
TRAVEL COSTS. Two sets of travel costs are presented which
could result from consolidation of USMC A-6E, pilot and bom-
bardier/navigator (B/N) training at either NAS Whidbey Island
or NAS Oceana. Option A costs consider all USMC pilots and
B/Ns training at NAS Whidbey Island. Option B costs consider
Category I (First Tour) pilots and B/Ns plus two transition
pilots trained at NAS Whidbey Island and all Category II
(Refresher) pilots and B/Ns training at NAS Oceana. Both
options are based on pilots and bombardier/navigator training
being conducted on Temporary Duty Under Instruction (TEMDUINS)
orders while on Permanent Change of Station (PCS) orders.
The following assumptions were made for all costing:
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1. All Category I pilots and bombardier/navigators are
First Lieutenants on PCS orders from Corpus Christi,
Texas or Pensacola, Florida.
2. Fifty percent of all Category I trainees are married,
no children over 2 years of age. Their household goods
weigh 2,500 pounds.
3. Single Category I trainees household goods weigh 1,000
pounds
.
4. Two transition pilots and all Category II (Refresher)
pilots/BNs are Captains, married with two children.
Their household goods weigh 5,000 pounds. All are on
PCS orders from Washington, D.C.
5. Sixty percent of all pilots and bombardier/navigators
are on PCS orders to MCAS Cherry Point; forty percent
are on PCS orders to MCAS El Toro.
6. Weapons deployment TAD is included in TEMDUINS per diem.
Option A Travel Costs
All USMC A-6E pilots and bombardier/navigator trainees
are trained at NAS Whidbey Island by VA-128. Category I
pilots and B/Ns plus two transition pilots are in training
for 140 days. Category II pilots and B/Ns are trained by
VA-128 at NAS Whidbey Island; training lasts 112 days.
Option B Travel Costs
Category I pilots and B/Ns plus two transition pilots
are in training for 140 days.
Category II pilots and B/Ns are in training for 112 days.
In addition to the two sets of travel costs which could
result from consolidation - a set of costs which represent
the status quo, i.e., training USMC crews at MCAS Cherry
Point, are included for comparison purposes. The total annual
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travel costs for Option A are $220,171; Option B $219,541;
and status quo $125,104.
The derivation of costs for Options A and B plus the
Status Quo are contained in Tables III through V.
ORDNANCE COSTS. The cost of additional ordnance required by
the proposals was computed on the basis of published syllabus
levels, data from the 1975 study which was determined to still
be relevant, and information provided by operations personnel
at the training squadrons concerning actual usage levels. It
was determined that inherent variations in the weapons syllabi
(such as the several Navy flights which called for either an
instructor or a replacement B/N in the right seat) combined
with a variety of contributing factors (such as weather, air-
craft availability and target availability) served to vary
considerably the amount of ordnance expended by any one stu-
dent. Consequently, the figures provided are the best avail-
able averages and should be analyzed as such. All ordnance
figures are rounded to the nearest five and dollar amounts
to the nearest $100. No allowance has been made for repeated
flights as the available information was considered too vague
and general to be of productive use. Ordnance requirements
to support USMC under consolidation are shown in Table VI.





AIRCRAFT DIRECT COSTS. All direct aircraft costs are taken
from the Navy Program Factors Manual OPNAV- 90P- 02A (Revised
31 Aug 77) which was designed for use in the estimating of
dollar and manpower resources required to operate and support
a single ship or aircraft. The factors reflect the Program
Objective Memorandum for FY 79 (POM- 79). Factors are computed
by the Navy Resource Model (NARM) from the data base used in
the Five Year Defense Plan and the Program Objective Memo-
randum.
Direct costs are used in this study as the Marine Corps
indirect costs are not included in the factors manual. All
costs are for a 1-year time period and are in FY 79 dollars.
Modeled direct costs for aircraft are derived by taking basic
factors received from other offices and mathematically
manipulating them to produce broader factors such as air
operations and replenishment spares costs.
The equation for Total Direct Cost is:
G = D + N + M
where
G = Total Direct
D = Direct Operations and Maintenance
N = Annual Replenishment Spares
M = Annual Direct Military Personnel, Navy
Annual Direct Military Personnel costs have been removed
from the equation for use in this study to avoid double counting.
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All associated personnel costs have been delineated under the
separate Personnel Costs section.
AIRCRAFT INVESTMENT COSTS. A-6E investment costs are based
on the reduced number of aircraft required under consolidation
times the acquisition cost supplied by the NAVPRO Office at
Grumman. TC4C investment costs are based on the reduced
number of aircraft required under consolidation times the
acquisition cost supplied by NAVAIRSYSCOM AIR 4131. Option A
requires two less A-6E aircraft and two less TC4C aircraft.
Option B requires four less A-6E aircraft and two less TC4C
aircraft. Table VIII identifies investment and annual direct
costs (savings) for Options A and B. Table IX summarizes the





























































* Enlisted Personnel Total Cost Reduction - 2,108,658
Total Officer and Enlisted Billet Cost Reduction - $3,000,258
*Officer Personnel Billet Cost Data provided by B-K Dynamics, Inc.,
2 August 1978, via BUPERS 212.





OPTIONS A AND B ANNUAL PERSONNEL COST REDUCTIONS
BASED ON CURRENT ONBOARD COUNT VA-128 AND VMAT (AW) - 2 2
OPTION A
OFFICER INCREASE 1
MAJ 1 @ 60,200 +60,200
Officer Personnel Increase* +60,200
ENLISTED DECREASE 64
E-9 1 @ 28,800 -28,800
E-8
E-7 2 5 23,025 -46,050
E-6 5 @ 19,468 -97,340
E-5 12 3 15,620 -187,440










































Enlisted Personnel Rec 1,491,066
Total Officer and Enlisted Billet Cost Reduction - 1,781,266
*Officer Personnel Billet Cost Data Provided by B-K Dynamics,
Inc., 2 August 1978 via BUPERS 212.
**Enlisted Personnel Billet Cost Data derived from NPRDC




OPTION A TRAVEL COSTS
Category I Pilots
30 @ 10* mile x 2375 (CC-WI)* 7,125.00
18 @ 10* mile x 3016 (WI-CP) 5,428.80
12 @ 10* mile x 1237 (WI-ET) 1,484.40
9 Family @ 7* mile x 1563 (CC-CP) 984.69
6 Family @ 7* mile x 1461 (CC-ET) 613.62
15 x 241.50 Dislocation Allowance (M) 3,622.50
15 x 190.80 Dislocation Allowance (S) 2,862.00
9 @ 2500# (CC-CP) @ 877.75 7,899.75
9 <§ 1000# (CC-CP) @ 523.15 4,708.35
6 @ 2500# (CC-ET) @ 851.50 5,109.00
6 9 1000# (CC-ET) @ 515.65 3,093.90
30 @ 9.70 Per Diem 140 days 40,740.00
15 @ $l/day Separation Allowance x 140 days 2,100. 00
85,772.,01
Category II Pilots and 2 Transition Pilots
10 @ 10* mile x 2765 (DC-WI) 2,765..00
6 @ 10* mile x 3016 (WI-CP) 1,809. 60
4 8 10* mile x 1237 (WI-ET) 494. 80
6 Family @ 14* mile x 340 (DC-CP) 285.,60
4 Family 9 14* mile x 2654 (DC-ET) 1,486. 24
10 x 271.20 Dislocation Allowance (M) 2,712..00
6 x 5000# (DC-CP) @ 850.25 5,101. 50
4 x 5000# (DC-ET) @ 2950.75 11,803. , 00
8 x $1 x 112 Days 896. 00
2 x $1 x 140 Days 280. 00
8 x $9.70 Per Diem x 112 days 8,691..20







CC = Corpus Christi
CP = Cherry Point
DC = Washington, DC
ET = El Toro
PC = Pensacola, FL
WI = Whidbey Island
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TABLE III - OPTION A TRAVEL COSTS (Continued)
Category I Bombardier/Navigator
23 @ 10* mile x 2750 (PC-WI) 6,325.,00
14 @ 10* mile x 3016 (WI-CP) 4,222. 40
9 @ 10* mile x 1237 (WI-ET) 1,113..30
7 @ 7* mile x 825 (PC-CP*) 404. 25
5 § 7* mile x 1979 (PC-ET) 692.,65
12 X 241.50 Dislocation Allowance (M) 2,898. 00
11 X 190.80 Dislocation Allowance (S) 2,098.,80
7 @ 2500# (PC-CP) @ 659 4,613. 00
7 @ 1000# (PC-CP) @ 448.15 3,137,,05
5 @ 2500# (PC-ET) @ 959 4,795,,00
4 @ 1000# (PC-ET) @ 547.15 2,188,,60
12 3 $l/day Separation Allowance a : 140 days 1,680,,00
23 @ $9.70 Per Diem 140 days 31,234,,00
65,402.05
Category II Bombardier/Navigator
9 @ 10* mile x 2765 (DC-WI)
6 @ 10* mile x 3016 (WI-CP)
3 @ 10* mile x 1237 (WI-ET)
6 Family @ 14* mile x 340 (DC-CP)
3 Family @ 14* mile x 2654 (DC-ET)
9 x 271.20 Dislocation Allowance (M)
6 x 5000# (DC-CP) @ 850.25
3 x 5000# (DC-ET) @ 1852.75
9 x $l/day Separation Allowance x 112 days
9 g $9.70 per diem 112 days






















2 @ 10* mile x 2765 (DC-WI) 553.00
1 @ 10* mile x 3016 (WI-DP) 301.60
1 9 10* mile x 1237 (WI-ET) 123.70
1 Family @ 14* mile x 340 (DC-CP) 47.60
1 Family @ 14* mile x 2654 (DC-ET) 371.56
2 x 271.20 dislocation allowance (M) 542.40
1 x 5000# @ 850.25 (DC-CP) 850.25
1 x 5000# @ 2950.75 (DC-ET) 2,950.75
2 x $l/day Separation Allowance x 140 days 280.00
2 x $9.70 per diem x 140 days 2, 716. 00
Cost for Transition - 8,736.86
Total Cost: Category I P + B/N + 2 Trans. -159,910.92
Category II Pilots and Bombardiers/Navigators
17 @ 10* mile x 206 (DC-OA) 350.20
10 @ 10* mile x 193 (OA-CP) 195.00
7 @ 10* mile x 2670 (OA-ET) 1,869.00
10 Family @ 14* mile x 340 (DC-CP) 476.00
7 Family @ 14* mile x 2654 (DC-ET) 2,600.92
17 x 271.20 dislocation allowance (M) 4,610.40
10 x 5000# @ 850.25 (DC-CP) 8,502.50
7 x 5000* @ 2950.75 (DC-ET) 20,655.25
17 x 9.70 per diem x 112 days 18,468.80
17 x $l/day Separation Allowance x 112 davs 1, 904. 00
59,630.07
Annual Travel Cost Grand Total - $ 219, 540. 99
*See Option A for breakdown of costs.
Legend:
DC = Washington, DC
M = married ET = El Toro
# = pounds OA = Oceana




STATUS QUO TRAVEL COSTS
Category I Pilots
30 g 10* mile x 1563 (CC-CP) 4,689. 00
12 g 10* mile x 2635 (CP-ET) 3,162. 00
15 F<imily @ 7* mile x 1563 (CC-CP) 1,641. 15
6 Family @ 7* mile x 2635 (CP-ET) 1,106. 70
15 X 241.50 Dislocation Allowance (M) 3,622. 50
15 X 190.50 Dislocation Allowance (S) 2,857. 50
6 X 241.50 Dislocation Allowance (CO-ET) (M) 1,449. 00
6 X 190. 50. Dislocation Allowance 1,143 00
15 g 2500# (CC-CP) g 877.75 13,166. 25
15 @ 1000# (CC-CP) 5 523.15 7,847. 25
6 g 2500# (CP-ET) g 1064 6,384 00





Category II Pilots $ 2 Transition P Llots
10 10* mile x 340 (DC-CP) 340. 00
4 1 10* mile x 2655 (CP-ET) 1,054 00
10 Family @ 14* mile x 540 (DC-CP) 476. 00
4 Family g 14* mile x 2635 (CP-ET) 1,475. 60
10 X 271.20 Dislocation Allowance 2,712. 00
10 X 5000# (DC-CP) g 827.50 8,275. 00
4 X 5000# (CP-ET) g 1902.75 7,611. 00






1,897.23 10* mile x 825 (PC-CP) 50
9 @ 10* mile x 2635 (CP-ET) 2,371 50
12 Family @ 7* mile x 825 (PC-CP) 693. 00
5 Family g 7* mile x 2655 (CP-ET) 922. 25
12 X 241.50 Dislocation Allowance (M) 2,898. 00
11 X 190.50 Dislocation Allowance (S) 2,095. 50
5 X 241.50 Dislocation Allowance (M) 1,207 50
4 X 190.50 Dislocation Allowance (S) 762. 00
12 g 2500# (PC-CP) 3 659 7,908. 00
9 @ 1000# (PC-CP) @ 448.15 4,033. 35
5 g 2500# (CP-ET) g 1064.00 5,320. 00




TABLE V. STATUS QUO TRAVEL COSTS (Continued)
Category II Bombardier/Navigator
9 @ 10* mile x 340 (DC-CP)
3 § 10* mile x 2635 CCP-ET)
9 Family @ 14* mile x 340 (DC-CP)
3 Family @ 14* mile x 2635 (CP-ET)
9 x 5000# (DC-CP) g 827. 50
3 x 5000# (CP-ET) @ 1902.75
3 x 271.20 Dislocation Allowance (CP-ET)
19,041.75










S = s ingle
# = pounds
CC = Corpus Christi
CP = Cherry Point
DC = Washington, DC
ET = El Toro




ORDNANCE REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT USMC
UNDER CONSOLIDATION
MK-76
NAVY MARINE ADD. ORD. ADD. PILOTS TOTAL
NAVAL AVIATORS
Category I 185 140 45 32* 1,440
Category II 140 80 60
_8 480
TOTALS 325 220 105 40 1,920
NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICERS ADD. B/Ns
Category I 90 70 20 23 460
Category II 75 60 15 9 135
TOTALS 165 130 55 32 595
2,515
2.7 5 ROCKETS NAVY MARINE ADD. ORD. ADD. PILOTS TOTAL
NAVAL AVIATORS
Category I 30 20 10 32* 320
Category II 30 20 10
_8_ 80
TOTALS 60 40 20 40 400
NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICERS ADD. B/Ns
Category I 20 20 25
















Includes 2 transition pilots
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TABLE VI. ORDNANCE REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT USMC
UNDER CONSOLIDATION (Continued)
MK-104 (Continued)
NAVY MARINE ADD. ORD. ADD. PILOTS TOTAL
MK-8 SERIES (INERT)
NAVAL AVIATORS
Category I 15 15 32* 480
Category II 15
_0 11 _8 120





































ORDNANCE COSTS TO SUPPORT USMC
UNDER CONSOLIDATION
ORDNANCE SUMMARY AMOUNT PER UNIT COST * TOTAL
MK-76 2,515 $ 5.10 $12,800
2.75 ROCKET 400 65.00 26,000
MK-104 55 235.00 12,900
MK-80 (INERT) 600 235.00 141,000
MK-87 WSF 995 235.00 235,800
MK-4 5 FLARES 160 NOT AVAILABLE NOT AVAILABLE
TOTAL (MINUS FLARES) $ 426,500
Under Option A the entire additional cost of ordnance
would be charged to VA-128. Under Option B the cost would
be split on a 75/25 basis between VA-128 and VA-42.





INVESTMENT AND ANNUAL DIRECT COST (SAVINGS)
OPTION A - 100% USMC RP/BN TRAINING AT VA-128










(540,000) (97,540,997) (2,000,000) (52,595)
25,000 82,365,459 1,500






(540,000) (97,540,997) (2,000,000) (52,395)
25,000 67,589,921 1,500
NA NA NA












(856,871) (125,104) (10,608,000) (1,110,000)
220,171 10,912,000 426,500





(1,781,266)** (125,104) (10,608,000) (1,110,000)
159,911 8,928,000 519,875
NA 59,650 NA 106,625
NET CHANGE (1,781,266)** 94,457 (1,680,000 (1,110,000) 426,500
*Difference cost based on onboard VA-128/VMAT-202 + 100% NAVMMACLANT increment
**Difference cost based on onboard VA-128/VMAT-202 + 75% NAVMMACLANT increment
.
#A-6E aircraft @ $7,487,769 NAVPRO Grumman figure FY 79.
##TC4C aircraft @ $1,000,000 NAVAIRSYSCOM AIR 4151 (Last Acquisition).




COST SUMMARY, OPTION A AND OPTION B
INVESTMENT ANNUAL
COST DIRECT COST
OPTION A (17,490,538) (1,192,199)
OPTION B (32,466,076) (4,101,244)
Note: Dollars in ( ) indicate savings
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DIRECT A-6E COSTS TO SUPPORT USMC UNDER CONSOLIDATION
VMAT(AW)-202
ASSIGNED AIRCRAFT: 13 A-6E
COST (DIRECT) PER AIRCRAFT:
TOTAL
USMC TOTAL DIRECT OMN + *APN
816,000 646,000 170,000
TOTAL DIRECT COST 10,608,000 8,398,000 2,210,000
VA-128
REQUIRED ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT:
OPTION A - 100% 11
OPTION B - 75% 9
COST (DIRECT) PER AIRCRAFT:
CINCPACFLT TOTAL OMN APN
992,000 793,000 199,000
TOTAL COST (11) 10,912,000 8,723,000 2,189,000
TOTAL COST (9) 8,928,000 7,137,000 1,791,000
INCREMENTAL COST (SAVINGS)
OPTION A - 100%
AIRCRAFT: 13 minus 11 = 2 A-6E
DOLLARS: 10,912,000 minus 10,608,000 = 304,000
OPTION B - 75%
AIRCRAFT: 13 minus 9=4 A6E
DOLLARS: 10,608,000 minus 8,928,000 = (1,680,000)
:APN dollars for annual replenishment spares
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DIRECT TC4C COSTS TO SUPPORT USMC UNDER CONSOLIDATION
VMAT(AW)-2 02
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED: 2 TC4C
CUbi (D1KEL1J FhK AlKLKAf i :
TOTAL






REQUIRED ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT - TC4C
(Note: VA-128 requires three A-6E configured TC4C's
to conduct training under either OPTION A or OPTION ]
This requirement would entail only the transfer of
VMAT(AW) -20 2's A-6E configured TC4C and would result
in a net reduction of two TC4C's overall.)
INCREMENTAL SAVINGS:
OPTION A or OPTION B
AIRCRAFT: 2 minus = 2 TC4C's
DOLLARS: 1,110,000 minus = (1,110,000)
VA-4 2
Under OPTION B, VA-42 would be required to assume
responsibility for training 25% of the annual Marine
requirement. Since this corresponds to the current
projected decrease in their required Navy output,
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